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Given the growing importance of commitments to 
foreign investors in services in regional trade agreements, 
it is important to develop applied general equilibrium 
models to assess the impacts of liberalization of barriers to 
multinational service providers. This paper develops a 55 
sector applied general equilibrium model of Kenya with 
foreign direct investment and Dixit-Stiglitz productivity 
effects from additional varieties of imperfectly 
competitive goods or services, and uses the model to 
assess its regional and multilateral trade options, focusing 
on commitments to foreign investors in services. To 
assess the sensitivity of the results to parameter values, the 
model is executed 30,000 times, and results are reported 
as confidence intervals of the sample distributions. 
   The analysis reveals that a 50 percent preferential 
reduction in the ad valorem equivalents of barriers in 
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all business services by Kenya with its African partners 
would be somewhat beneficial for Kenya. If a preferential 
agreement with African partners is combined with an 
agreement with the European Union, the gains would 
more than triple the gains of an Africa only agreement. 
Multilateral reduction of services barriers, however, would 
yield gains about 12 times the gains of an agreement 
with the Africa region alone. These results suggest that 
preferential liberalization in the region is a valuable first 
step, but wider liberalization, with larger partners and 
liberal rules of origin or multilaterally, will yield much 
larger gains due to providing access to a much wider set 
of services providers. The largest gains would come from 
domestic regulatory reform in services, as this would 
almost triple the gains of multilateral liberalization.    1 
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or services, and uses the model to assess its regional and multilateral trade options, focusing on 
commitments to foreign investors in services. To assess the sensitivity of the results to parameter 
values, the model is executed 30,000 times, and results are reported as confidence intervals of the 
sample distributions.  
  
The analysis reveals that a 50 percent preferential reduction in the ad valorem equivalents 
of barriers in all business services by Kenya with its African partners would be somewhat 
beneficial for Kenya. If a preferential agreement with African partners is combined with an 
agreement with the European Union, the gains would more than triple the gains of an Africa only 
agreement.  Multilateral reduction of services barriers, however, would yield gains about 12 
times the gains of an agreement with the Africa region alone. These results suggest that 
preferential liberalization in the region is a valuable first step, but wider liberalization, with 
larger partners and liberal rules of origin or multilaterally, will yield much larger gains due to 
providing access to a much wider set of services providers.  The largest gains would come from 
domestic regulatory reform in services, as this would almost triple the gains of multilateral 
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Both economic theory and empirical literature have shown that wide availability of business 
services results in productivity gains to the manufacturing sector and contributes to its 
international competitiveness.
1  International commitments to national treatment and market 
access for foreign investors in key business services sectors may help developing countries 
obtain better access to these services that contribute to the productivity gains.  Some developing 
countries, however, are hesitant to make substantial multilateral commitments, but may be more 
inclined to proceed in regional arrangements with other neighboring developing countries, rather 
than with a major Northern partner. Commitments in services, however, are often limited in 
South-South arrangements.  
                                                            
1 Arnold et al. (2007), Fernandes (2007) and Fernandes and Paunov (2008) have provided econometricestimates of 
the gains from services liberalization.  Marshall (1988) shows that in three regions in the United Kingdom 
(Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester) almost 80 percent of the services purchased by manufacturers were bought 
from suppliers within the same region.   He cites studies which show that firm performance is enhanced by the local 
availability of producer services. In developing countries, McKee (1988) argues that the local availability of 
producer services is very important for the development of leading industrial sectors. 
 
Both the urban economics literature (Vernon, 1960; Chinitz, 1961) and the modern economic geography literature 
(e.g., Krugman, 1991; Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999) have focused on the fact that related economic activity 
is economically concentrated due to agglomeration externalities (e.g., computer businesses in Silicon Valley, 
ceramic tiles in Sassuolo, Italy).  Evidence comes from a variety of sources.  Ciccone and Hall (1996) show that 
firms operating in economically dense areas are more productive than firms operating in relative isolation. Caballero 
and Lyons (1992) show that productivity increases in industries when output of its input supplying industries 
increases. Hummels (1995) shows that most of the richest countries in the world are clustered in relatively small 
regions of Europe, North America and East Asia, while the poor countries are spread around the rest of the world. 
He argues this is partly explained by transportation costs for inputs since it is more expensive to buy specialized 
inputs in countries that are far away for the countries where a large variety of such inputs are located. 
   3 
Since the early 1990s, regional trade agreements have surged; 283 have been notified to 
the WTO and were in force as of February 2010. 
2  Given the inclusion of services in modern 
FTA agreements negotiated with the EU, the US and in some other agreements, economists need 
to be able to assess the impact of services commitments as part of their advice to governments 
regarding preferential trade agreements.  Services commitments in regional agreements could 
lead to substantial productivity improvements. But is there an analogy to trade diversion in goods 
whereby preferential commitments in services could be immiserizing?  Are developing countries 
likely to obtain substantially larger gains from an agreement with a developed country, rather 
than a developing country?  How do the gains of preferential versus global liberalization 
compare?  
Given that preferential trade liberalization discriminates against excluded countries, it is 
well known from the vast theoretical literature that preferential liberalization of goods may lead 
to either gains or losses of welfare. Perhaps motivated by this uncertainty of outcomes of their 
agreements, policy-makers have expressed considerable demand for analysis of these 
agreements. Applied modelers have responded with applied general equilibrium models that 
focus on goods. So the literature now contains a substantial number of studies that examine 
regional agreements in goods.
3 But this paper and the Jensen and Tarr (2010) paper are the first 
                                                            
2See  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.  This does not include a significant number of 
regional agreements that are in force (among developing countries) that have not been notified to the WTO.  
3 The more prominent studies include Harris (1984), Cox and Harris (1986), Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996), 
Smith and Venables (1988), Baldwin, Forslid and Haarland (2000), several in the Francois and Shiells (1994) 
volume, Levy and van Wijnbergen (1995), Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1997a), Rutherford, Rutstrom and Tarr 
(1993), Rutherford, Rutstrom and Tarr (1995), Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (2002), Rutherford and Tarr (2003) 
and Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr and Gurgel (2004). See Jensen and Tarr (2010) for a review of this literature.    4 
numerical studies of regional arrangements that assess the impact of commitments to 
multinational firms who will undertake foreign direct investment in services.
4  
Given substantial demand by governments for advice on their prospective trade policies 
in the regional and multilateral arenas, it is unfortunate that the profession does not have a 
framework for assessing the ex ante welfare impact of preferential reduction of barriers against 
foreign direct investment in business services. We attempt to fill that gap in this paper. Crucial to 
the analysis, we incorporate the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier mechanism of endogenous productivity 
gains from additional varieties of imperfectly produced goods and services. 
Jensen and Tarr (2010) have shown that if domestic firms capture rents from the barriers 
against multinational providers of services, then these rents are analogous to tariff losses in 
goods, and losses may occur from preferential liberalization of services. Moreover, with 
imperfect competition, preferential liberalization will lead to a gain of varieties from the partner 
countries, but a loss of varieties from excluded countries; the lost varieties can lead to a net loss 
of welfare. We simulate examples of cases where there is a loss of welfare due to the loss of 
varieties and show how key elasticities in the model influence the result.  
                                                            
4 Earlier papers that examined the impact of barriers to foreign direct investment in services include the 
following. Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2005) developed a stylized model where foreign direct 
investment is required for entry of new multinational competitors in services, but they did not apply this 
model to the data of an actual economy. Brown and Stern (2001) and Dee et al. (2003) employ multi-
country numerical models with many of the same features of  Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr.  Their 
models contain three sectors, agriculture, manufacturing and services, and are thus also rather stylized. 
The Dixit-Stiglitz endogenous productivity effect from the impact of service sector liberalization on 
product variety is not mentioned in the results of Brown and Stern and are interpreted as of little relevance 
in Dee et al.
 4  Konan and Maskus (2006) develop a small open economy constant returns to scale model 
with an initial monopoly in services sectors that results in monopoly rents and increased costs. They 
examine the impact of exogenously allowing additional firms to enter.  The papers by Jensen, Rutherford 
and Tarr (2007) and Rutherford and Tarr (2008) on Russian WTO accession are the closest to this model; 
but there was only one aggregate rest of the world in those models, so there was no possible consideration 
of regional impacts in those papers. 
   5 
Kenya is an example of a country facing most of the policy choices mentioned above. In 
many of its business services sectors, including maritime and road transportation, banking, 
insurance and professional services, the regulatory regime imposes significant burdens on the 
cost of providing services, both by Kenyan service providers and by multinationals.  In 2010 it 
was involved in negotiations of commitments in services in various regional arrangements, 
including the Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union, COMESA and the 
East African Customs Union.
5 And in the context of its international negotiations under the Doha 
Development Agenda, Kenya may be called upon to make further commitments in the business 
services area. Kenya is proceeding cautiously regarding services commitments in all these areas, 
but is taking steps to adopt a mutual recognition agreement in professional services within the 
East African Customs Union.  
In this paper we develop a 55-sector small open economy comparative static computable 
general equilibrium model of Kenya that we believe is appropriate to evaluate the impact of 
Kenyan liberalization of services barriers.  We build on the model of Balistreri, Rutherford and 
Tarr (2009), but we decompose the rest of the world into three regions: the European Union; our 
Africa region; and the Rest of the World. All foreign regions are sources of foreign direct 
investment in some of the business services sectors. 
We find that a 50 percent preferential reduction in the ad valorem equivalents of barriers 
in all business services with respect to its African regional partners would be slightly beneficial 
for Kenya in our central elasticity case. But an agreement with the EU is worth more than twice 
as much as an agreement with the Africa region, and if preferential liberalization with the Africa 
region  is  combined  with  an  agreement  with  the  EU,  the  gains  would  more  triple.  If  the 
                                                            
5 See table 1 for a list of COMESA (Common Market of East and Southern Africa) and East AfricanCustoms Union 
countries.   6 
liberalization  of  business  services  commitments  is  extended  to  all  foreign  partners  (called 
―Unilateral‖ in the tables), the gains would increase by twelve times compared with an African 
agreement alone.  Thus, these results suggest that preferential liberalization in the region is a 
valuable first step, but wider liberalization, with larger partners or multilaterally will yield much 
larger gains due to providing access to a much wider set of services providers.  
Finally, we estimate that a serious effort to reduce non-discriminatory regulatory barriers 
(that is, barriers that raise the costs of Kenyans as well as foreign services providers in Kenya) 
would almost triple the benefits of multilateral liberalization in Kenya.  
Multilateral liberalization yields larger gains than preferential liberalization since with 
preferential liberalization Kenya will not obtain additional service sector suppliers from excluded 
countries, and, in fact, Kenya will suffer losses of service sector suppliers in excluded countries. 
Moreover,  we  summarize  research  below  that  shows  that  small  countries  gain  more 
technological spillovers from trade with technologically advanced countries (at least in research 
and development intensive products).  Our model allows for differentiated rates of technological 
spillover by region and product, and this is the main explanation for why the estimated gains 
from a preferential agreement with the EU will yield larger gains for Kenya than a preferential 
agreement with the African region.  
Combining African regional liberalization with regional liberalization with the EU would 
capture the gains from agreements with both regions. Kenya could combine an agreement with 
the EU and the Africa region with liberal rules of origin, and the results would then come closer 
to the gains from unilateral liberalization with the whole world.  
 
   7 
 
We devote considerable attention to the sensitivity of our results to uncertainty in the 
parameters. First, to understand the model better, we conduct piecemeal sensitivity of the results, 
where we isolate the impact of each of the parameters to ascertain which parameters most 
strongly impact the results. Second, to assess the robustness of the results to parameter 
uncertainty, we conduct systematic sensitivity analysis, where we execute the model 30,000 
times. Each simulation is based on a random draw of all the parameter values; we then present 
sample distributions and sample confidence intervals of the key variables.
6 Regarding Kenya’s 
preferential arrangement with the Africa region, we find, from the systematic sensitivity analysis, 
that there is a 9.5 chance that Kenya would lose. If Kenyans are assumed to capture the rents 
from barriers in services, then the mean estimate is that Kenya would lose.  
We conduct sensitivity on a range of values of key parameters that determine the 
productivity impacts in imperfect competition. In the Kenya-Africa scenario, we show that there 
is a set of plausible parameter values that result in sufficient loss of varieties from the rest of the 
world and the EU region that there would be negative welfare effects for Kenya. This shows that 
under imperfect competition there is an extension of the trade diversion results of perfect 
competition.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we provide an overview of the Kenyan 
services sectors. We discuss how we estimated the tariff equivalents of the barriers in services in 
section III. We provide an overview of the model in section IV and a discussion of the data in 
section V. The central results are presented in section VI and sensitivity results are presented in 
section VII. Given the initiative of the East African Customs Union to begin to include services 
                                                            
6 The systematic sensitivity analysis has been conducted with the range of parameters values shown in table 22, with 
the exception of the elasticity of firm supply with respect to price. For this latter elasticities, , the systematic 
sensitivity analysis was done with these elasticities equal to 2 for the Africa and Kenyan regions, ten for the EU and 
15 for the Rest of the World (for all sectors).    8 
in their agreements by negotiating mutual recognition agreements in professional services, we 
focus on a range of possible policy options in professional services. These are presented in 
section VIII. Conclusions are presented in section IX. In appendix A, we discuss the trade and 
tariff data in some detail. We document the calculation of ownership shares by sector and region 
in appendix B. How we obtained estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticities in goods is described 
in appendix C. The explanation of the estimation of the ad valorem equivalents of barriers in 
professional services, done by Nora Dihel and Josaphat Kweka, is explained in appendix D.  
 
II. Overview of the Kenyan Service Sectors 
   
In this section, we summarize the key institutional and policy issues in 
telecommunications, banking, insurance and transportation. This discussion is based on several 
policy notes written on the Kenyan business services sectors. 
 
Transportation 
One bright spot in the Kenyan transportation network is its air transportation services. In recent 
years, Kenya allowed private sector development (both Kenyan and foreign) to develop the air 
transportation links. The efficient air transportation services facilitate the important tourism sector and 
have been instrumental in the development of the Kenyan cut flower industry, which in turn has 
contributed to growth and poverty reduction. 
However, Kenya’s port, rail and road transportation facilities are significant problems for 
transportation of its goods and for the competitiveness of its exports (for details see Helu, 2007; Ochieng, 
2007; and World Bank, 2007). Its principal port, Mombassa, is plagued by poor infrastructure and 
complicated bureaucratic procedures. As a result, it takes an average of two weeks to clear a container at 
the port and more than four weeks for over 5 percent of the containers. The cost of importing a container 
into Kenya exceeds USD 1300, while it is under USD 1,000 per container in Tanzania and South Africa   9 
and under USD 500 per container in Malaysia and Singapore.
7 Uncertainty over delivery times is a 
significant cost burden on manufactured exports. The port at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, is regarded as 
more efficient and container throughput has been growing much faster there.  
Due to a lack of investment, Kenya’s railways have significantly declined and are considered 
rather poor providers of freight transportation services since the 1980s.
8 Road transportation is the 
primary means of overland transport. But some sections of the key ―Northern Corridor‖ are in very poor 
condition. 
Kenya’s problems with its ports, rail and road transportation facilities were highlighted by 
Kenya’s ranking on the international Logistics Perception Index of 2004.
9 Of the 70 countries in the 2004 
survey, Kenya was ranked as the least logistically friendly (World Bank, 2007). In Africa, the survey 
included South Africa, Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria. For 2006, the survey expanded to include 150 




As of 2007, Kenya’s telecommunications services were expensive compared with other Sub-
Saharan African countries and even more when compared with those of East and South Asia. Relative to 
countries with comparable income, Kenya had fewer fixed lines per capita, less than half the level of 
international calls per subscriber and higher Internet charges. Perhaps more important is the low 
efficiency of service provision (see World Bank, 2007, pp.45-47). Kenya currently requires that telephone 
companies must be at least 30 percent owned by Kenyan nationals. Problems related to the licensing of 
the third mobile telephone provider
10 and the ―Second National Operator‖ were primarily due to this 
                                                            
7 World Bank staff estimates.  
8 In the hope of improved performance, Kenya’s railways were turned over to Rift Valley Railways, a South African 
company, in November 2006. 
9 The Logistics Perception Index measures the perceptions of managerial level personnel of international freight 
forwarding companies. It is published by the Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade and 
available at: www.gfptt.org. 
10 Regarding the third mobile telephone operator, a consortium of a local investor (Kenya National Federation of 
Cooperatives, KNFC) and foreign investors (Econet Wireless) won the tender in February 2004.  But the consortium 
was put together to meet the 30 percent local ownership requirement, not because of business reasons. Citing deals   10 
restraint. In fact, the Government has acknowledged that the 30 percent ownership requirement is 
delaying licensing of additional telecom operators.
11  
By the end of 2009, however, the duopoly of Zain and Safaricom was broken by the addition of 
two additional operators to the market: Orange Kenya and Essar Telecom Kenya.  Subscribers increased 
to 19.4 million, or 49.7 percent of the population, almost all of whom were prepaid subscribers.  About 85 
percent of the population lived in a region where service was provided. According to the Communications 
Commission of Kenya, prices of mobile services were declining due to competition among the four 
operators. Safaricom was the leader in mobile banking software for its telephones and thus succeeded in 
capturing back significant market share.   
Data transmissions are especially expensive by international standards. The primary explanation 
for the high cost of these services is that until recently East Africa was the only major coastline in the 
world without access to a fiber-optic cable network. In early 2008, these services were provided by 
satellite services, which are more expensive than fiber optic seabed cable. However, the completion of the 
SEACOM and TEAMS fiber optic cable systems in 2009 and the expected operation of the EASSy 
system in mid-2010 should lower the costs of internet and data transmission services. A reduction in the 
costs of internet transmission services will likely result in more internet service users.  More internet users 
will likely allow achievement of economies of scale in production that would further reduce costs. 
However, according to one expert, as of early 2010, the main consequence of the TEAMS and SEACOM 
project completion has been increasing speed, but not lowering of costs.
12  
While there are obviously serious economic problems in the telecom sector, the government has 
implemented significant reforms in the sector in the last ten years. The government’s strategy for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
made by a previous CEO of KNFC, KNFC at one point wrote to the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) 
withdrawing from the consortium. KNFC later withdrew its letter of objection, but lost its controlling share of the 
consortium. CCK, nonetheless, awarded the license to Econet Wireless and court battles ensued. The Government 
eventually suspended the entire CCK board and its Director General, and suspended the license of Econet. In April 
2007, Econet has agreed to withdraw its court case and settle the matter out of court. Ultimately, it began operating 
under the brand name ―Yu‖ and changed its name to Essar Telecom Kenya in April 2009.  
. 
11 ―SNO to get a year to meet local ownership rule,‖ The Saturday Standard, Business section, April 14, 2007. 
 
12 See www.moseskemibaro.com/2010/01/02/a-review-of-kenyas-ict-position-in-2009/   11 
sector is outlined in the Postal and Telecommunications Policy Statement of 1997.
13 The strategy outlines 
a more liberal and private sector led strategy designed to optimize the sector’s contribution to economic 
growth of Kenya (Matano and Njeru, 2007).  The Kenya Communications Act of 1998 created the 
Communication Commission of Kenya as an independent regulator of the sector. The monopoly rights of 
Telekom Kenya Ltd expired on June 30, 2004. Since then significant competition has been introduced 
into the sector and the Communication Commission of Kenya introduced the modern and efficient 
―Unified Licensing Framework‖ for licensing of telecommunications companies.   The estimates of this 
paper can be taken as an assessment of the effective implementation of this reform program.  
 
Banking and Insurance 
Banking.  Relative to other countries in Africa, Kenya has a well developed financial sector. The 
cost of credit does not appear to be a major constraint for large enterprises.  Nonetheless, medium, small 
and micro enterprises have severe problems accessing credit.
14  Only about 1.5 percent of the credit these 
enterprises receive is from banks, and about 90 percent of them have no access to credit. Their problems 
accessing credit is because of: the high costs to banks of evaluating and monitoring credit to small 
enterprises; the absence of credit rating agencies, deficiencies in the legal system that make enforcement 
of debt contracts difficult and push collateral requirements too high for small firms; many small firms 
lack the capacity to process bank paperwork; and many small firms do not have access to insurance that 
would significantly reduce the risk to banks and the collateral required. 
Foreign banks can operate in Kenya, either by acquiring a Kenyan bank or by obtaining a license 
to operate as a Kenyan affiliate bank of a multinational bank. In practice, affiliates of multinational banks 
are provided full market access and national treatment, but Kenya has not ―bound‖ this practice at the 
WTO. The European Union has requested that Kenya commit to national treatment of foreign investment 
                                                            
13 This statement is consistent with the government’s Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth Creation (ERS) 
14 Despite the credit problems, it is the medium and small enterprises that are the fastest growing part of 
the Kenyan economy. They increased their share of GDP from 13.8 in 1993 to 18.4 in 1999.   12 
in the sector by binding this commitment at the WTO (Kiptui, 2007). Branch banking by foreign banks, 
however, is not permitted.  
Insurance.  The insurance market in Kenya is small, but is considered one of the more developed 
in Africa. Similar to banking issues, however, medium, small and micro enterprises have little access to 
insurance (World Bank, 2007). Regarding the regulatory environment, cross border provision of 
insurance is limited to cargo insurance and reinsurance services. In addition, the ownership of an 
insurance company must be at least one-third Kenyan and one-third of the members of the Boards of 
Directors must be Kenyan. 
 
Distribution Services 
Distribution services are the wholesale and retail trade sector of the economy. In Kenya in 2004 
this sector accounted for about 10 percent of GDP, there were 217,000 retail outlets and about 66 percent 
of these retail outlets were either small retail stores or kiosks. Only one-half a percent of the outlets are 
super markets or very large stores. It is necessary to distinguish agricultural marketing from the marketing 
of manufactured goods.  
Prior to 1993, many agricultural products, including maize, coffee and tea had to be sold to State 
Marketing Boards. The State Marketing Boards had an exclusive right to purchase, distribute and import 
these products.  Since the reforms of 1993, farmers are now free to sell to private traders or to mills or the 
final consumer directly, but they still have the option to sell to the State Marketing Board if they choose. 
On the other hand, distribution of manufacturing goods has traditionally been handled by the private 
sector. 
Presently numerous business licenses are required and many are considering damaging forms of 
government regulation (Onyango, 2007). The Government established a committee to review 1335 
licenses. Draft laws and regulations have been prepared to implement the recommendations of the 
committee but have not yet been implemented as of mid-2007. In addition, restrictions on large scale 
outlets, shop opening hours and zoning restraints on business have been criticized as unnecessary burdens 
on business.    13 
With respect to discriminatory restraints on foreign investors, Kenya requires that foreigners 
conduct business only in areas designated as general business areas. Local partners are encouraged, but 
not required. Expatriates employees are limited and the company must demonstrate that the skills are not 
available locally. 
 
Professional Services  
  There are rather severe restrictions on the rights of foreigners to operate with a license in many of 
the professional services sectors, including legal, accounting, auditing and engineering services. The East 
African Customs Union is making its first foray into commitments in the services areas by encouraging 
mutual recognition agreements among the members. In appendix D, we provide details on the situation in 
engineering services sectors.   
 
III. Estimation of the Tariff Equivalence of the Regulatory Barriers 
 
Estimates of the ad valorem equivalents of the regulatory barriers in services are key to the 
results. In order to make these estimates, we first need to assess the regulatory environment in the services 
sectors in our model. We commissioned a 54 page survey of the regulatory regimes in key Kenyan 
business services sectors, namely, insurance, banking, fixed line and mobile telecommunications services 
and maritime transportation services.
 15 We supplemented this information based on a good set of studies 
on the services sectors that were presented at the conference on ―Trade in Services‖ in Nairobi, Kenya on 
March 26, 27, 2007. In particular, we examined the papers by: Kiptui (2007) on financial services; Ndaro 
(2007) or communication services; Helu (2007) on maritime services; Ochieng (2007) on transport 
services; and Oresi (2007) on railway services. The study by the World Bank (2007) provided additional 
detail on the key issues in the sectors and the Telecommunications Management Group (2007) provided 
extensive details on telecoms. Tarr (2007a, 2007b) summarized this information in telecommunications 
                                                            
15  We thank Ms. Sonal Sejpal of the law firm of Anjarwalla & Khanna Advocates for leading this research effort.     14 
and transportation. These questionnaires and papers provided us with data and descriptions and 
assessments of the regulatory environment in these sectors.  
Mircheva (2007) then estimated the ad valorem equivalents of barriers to foreign direct 
investment in fixed line and mobile telecommunications, banking, insurance and maritime transportation 
services. The process involved converting the answers and data of the questionnaires into an index of 
restrictiveness in each industry. Mircheva followed the methodology of Kimura, Ando and Fujii (2004a, 
2004b, 2004c) to generate these estimates.   In the case of professional services, we used engineering 
services as a proxy for all professional services.
16 The details of the regulatory regime and the 
scoring are listed as appendix D.    
 
 This methodology further involves building on the estimates and methodology explained 
in the volume by C. Findlay and T. Warren (2000), notably papers by Warren (2000), McGuire 
and Schulele (2000) and Kang (2000).  For each of these service sectors, the authors evaluated 
the regulatory environment across many countries. The price of services is then regressed against 
the regulatory barriers to determine the impact of any of the regulatory barriers on the price of 
services. Mircheva (and Kweka in the case of engineering services) then assumed that the 
international regression applies to Kenya in the case that the above mentioned restrictiveness 
indexes are used. Applying that regression and their assessments of the regulatory environment 
in Kenya from the questionnaires and other information sources, she estimated the ad valorem 
impact of a reduction in barriers
17 both for discriminatory and non-discriminatory barriers. 
Mircheva then weighted her fixed line and mobile telecommunications estimates by their market 
shares to obtain her estimate for communications.    The results of the estimates of the ad 
valorem equivalents of the barriers are listed in table 4.  
In the case of professional services, we used engineering services as a proxy for all 
professional services.  In engineering services, we have the regression results from the paper by 
Ngyuen-Hong (2000). Based on an international data set, he estimates the ad valorem 
equivalents of barriers on trade in engineering services. No such estimates are available for other 
                                                            
16 The estimates were done by Josaphat Kweka, senior economist in the World Bank office in Tanzania in 
collaboration with Nora Dihel, Trade Coordinator for East Africa in the World Bank. 
17   Warren estimated quantity impacts and then using elasticity estimates was able to obtain price impacts. The 
estimates by Mircheva  that we employ are for ―discriminatory‖ barriers against foreign direct investment.    15 
professional services. Since the methodology we employ requires the existence of a cross-
country regression estimate of the impact of barriers to foreign direct investment, we must use 
engineering services as our proxy. The scoring was done by Josaphat Kweka, senior economist 
in the World Bank office in Tanzania. The details of the regulatory regime and the scoring are 
listed as appendix D. 
 
IV. Overview of the Model 
 
This paper builds on the algebraic structure of the model of Balistreri, Rutherford and 
Tarr (2009). Here we provide a general description of the structure described there and provide 
more details where we depart from that structure. There are 55 sectors in the model shown in table 1. 
Primary factors include skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labor; mobile capital; sector-specific capital in 
imperfectly competitive sectors; and primary inputs imported by multinational service providers, 
reflecting specialized management expertise or technology of the firm. The existence of sector specific 
capital in several sectors implies that there are decreasing returns to scale in the use of the mobile factors 
and supply curves in these sectors slope up.  We explain this further in the appendix.  
As in Balistreri, Rutherford and Tarr (2009), there are three categories of firms in the 
model: (1) perfectly competitive goods and services sectors: (2) imperfectly competitive goods 
sectors; and (3) imperfectly competitive services sectors with foreign direct investment. The cost, 
production and pricing structures in the three categories differ widely. The principal extension is 
that we disaggregate the rest of the world region of Balistreri, Rutherford and Tarr (2009) into 
three regions: (1) the European Union; (2) the union of the East African Customs Union and 
COMESA, which we call our African region; and (3) the Rest of the World. In the imperfectly 
competitive sectors, this requires introducing different firm types with distinct cost structures for 
each region. We retain the small open economy model framework, so only Kenya is modeled 
fully.    16 
Perfectly Competitive Goods and Services Sectors 
Regardless of sector, all firms minimize the cost of production. In the competitive goods 
and services sectors, goods or services are produced under constant returns to scale and where 
price equals marginal costs with zero profits. This includes all 20 of the agriculture sectors and 
19 manufacturing or services sectors, including some food processing sectors such as meat and 
dairy products and grain milling, and services such as construction, hotels and restaurants, postal 
communication, real estate, public administration, health and education. In these sectors, 
products are differentiated by country of origin, i.e., we employ the Armington assumption. All 
goods producing firms (including imperfectly competitive firms) can sell on the domestic market 
or export.  Firms optimize their output decision between exports and domestic sales based on 
relative prices and their constant elasticity of transformation production function. Having chosen 
how much to allocate between exports and domestic sales, firms also optimize their output 
decision between exports to the three possible export regions, based on relative prices the three 
regions and their constant elasticity of transformation production function for shifting output 
between the regions. 
 
Goods Produced Subject to Increasing Returns to Scale 
Goods in these seven sectors are differentiated at the firm level. We assume that 
manufactured goods may be produced domestically or imported for firms in any region in the 
model. Firms in these industries set prices such that marginal cost (which is constant) equals 
marginal revenue; and there is free entry, which drives profits to zero. For domestic firms, costs 
are defined by observed primary factor and intermediate inputs to that sector in the base year 
data. Foreigners produce the goods abroad at constant marginal cost but incur a fixed cost of   17 
operating in Kenya. The cif import price of foreign goods is simply defined by the import price, 
and, by the zero profits assumption, in equilibrium the import price must cover fixed and 
marginal costs of foreign firms. Domestic firms set prices using the Chamberlinian large group 
monopolistic competition assumption within a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, which results in 
constant markups over marginal cost for both foreign firms and domestic firms. 
We have made one significant modeling extension in the imperfectly competitive sectors 
compared to the Balistreri, Rutherford and Tarr (2009) model. In the Balistreri, Rutherford and 
Tarr model, domestic firms faced a perfectly elastic demand curve on export markets and they 
exported at marginal costs. In this model, all imperfectly competitive domestic firms (both goods 
and services producers) face a downward sloping demand curve in each of their three export 
markets. Consistent with firm level product differentiation, we assume that the elasticity of 
demand in each of the export markets is the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of demand. Firms then set 
marginal revenue equal to marginal costs in each of the three export markets; then the export 
market contribute to the quasi-rents of the firm and affect the entry and exit decisions of firms.  
Introducing downward sloping demand curves into the model means that there are 
possible terms of trade affects to consider in this model that were not present in the Jensen, 
Rutherford and Tarr model. Balistreri and Markusen (2009) have shown, however, that there 
should be virtually no role for optimal tariffs to exploit terms of trade effects. The reason is that, 
unlike perfectly competitive firms, imperfectly competitive firms are pricing such than marginal 
revenue equals marginal costs on export markets, which is the objective of optimal tariffs.    
For simplicity we assume that the composition of fixed and marginal cost is identical in 
all firms producing under increasing returns to scale (in both goods and services). This 
assumption in a our Dixit-Stiglitz based Chamberlinian large-group model assures that output per   18 
firm for all firm types remains constant, i.e., the model does not produce rationalization gains or 
losses.  
  The number of varieties affects the productivity of the use of imperfectly competitive 
goods based on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. The effective cost function for users of 
goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale declines in the total number of firms in the 
industry. 
  
Service Sectors That Are Produced under Increasing Returns to Scale and Imperfect 
Competition 
These nine sectors are telecommunications, banking and insurance services, various 
transportation services and professional business services. In these services sectors, we observe 
that some services are provided by foreign service providers on a cross border basis analogous to 
goods providers from abroad. But a large share of business services are provided by service 
providers with a domestic presence, both multinational and Kenyan.
18 Our model allows for both 
types of foreign service provision in these sectors. There are cross border services allowed in this 
sector and they are provided from abroad at constant costs—this is analogous to competitive 
provision of goods from abroad. Cross border services, however, are not good substitutes for 
service providers who have a domestic presence.
19 
Crucial to the results, we allow multinational service firm providers that choose to 
establish a presence in Kenya in order to compete with Kenyan firms directly.  As in the goods 
                                                            
18 One estimate puts the world-wide cross-border share of trade in services at 41% and the share of trade in services 
provided by multinational affiliates at 38%. Travel expenditures 20% and compensation to employees working 
abroad 1% make up the difference. See Brown and Stern (2001, table 1).  
19 Daniels (1985) found that service providers charge higher prices when the service is provided at a distance.   19 
sectors, services that are produced subject to increasing returns to scale are differentiated at the 
firm level. Firms in these industries set prices such that marginal cost (which is constant) equals 
marginal revenue; and there is free entry, which drives profits to zero.  We assume firm level 
product differentiation and employ the Chamberlinian large group monopolistic competition 
assumption within a Dixit-Stiglitz framework. Given our assumption on the composition of fixed 
and variable costs, we have constant markups over marginal cost for both foreign firms and 
domestic firms, i.e., no rationalization impacts. 
 For domestic firms, costs are defined by observed primary factors and intermediate 
inputs to that sector in the base year data.  When multinationals service providers decide to 
establish a domestic presence in Kenya, they will import some of their technology or 
management expertise. That is, foreign direct investment generally entails importing specialized 
foreign inputs. Thus, the cost structure of multinationals differs from national only service 
providers. Multinationals incur costs related to both imported primary inputs and Kenyan 
primary factors, in addition to intermediate factor inputs. Foreign provision of services differs 
from foreign provision of goods, since the service providers use Kenyan primary inputs. 
Domestic service providers do not import the specialized primary factors available to the 
multinationals. Hence, domestic service firms incur primary factor costs related to Kenyan labor 
and capital only.  These services are characterized by firm-level product differentiation. For 
multinational firms, the barriers to foreign direct investment affect their profitability and entry. 
Reduction in the constraints on foreign direct investment will induce foreign entry that will 
typically lead to productivity gains because when more varieties of service providers are 
available, buyers can obtain varieties that more closely fit their demands and needs (the Dixit-
Stiglitz variety effect).   20 
Evidence on the Role of Trade and FDI in Increasing Total Factor Productivity through 
Technology Transfer 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) have developed models of economic growth that have 
highlighted  the  role  of  trade  in  a  greater  variety  of  intermediate  goods  as  a  vehicle  for 
technological spillovers that allow less developed countries to close the technological gap with 
industrialized countries.  Similarly, Romer (1994) has argued that product variety is a crucial and 
often overlooked source of gains to the economy from trade liberalization. In our model, it is the 
greater availability of varieties that is the engine of productivity growth, but we believe there are 
other mechanisms as well through which trade may increase productivity.
20 Consequently, we 
take  variety  as  a  metaphor  for  the  various  ways  increased  trade  can  increase  productivity. 
Winters et al. (2004) summarize the empirical literature by concluding that ―the recent empirical 
evidence seems to suggest that openness and  trade liberalization have  a strong influence on 
productivity and its rate of change.‖ Some of the key articles regarding product variety are the 
following. Broda and Weinstein (2004) find that increased product variety contributes to a fall of 
1.2 percent per year in the ―true‖ import price index.  Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Schott 
(2004) have shown that product variety and quality are important in explaining trade between 
nations.  Feenstra et al. (1999) show that increased variety of exports in a sector increases total 
factor productivity in most manufacturing sectors in Taiwan (China) and Korea, and they have 
some evidence that increased input variety also increases total factor productivity. In business 
services, because of the high cost of using distant suppliers, the close availability of a diverse set 
of business services may be even more important for growth than in goods. The evidence for this 
was cited in the introduction section. 
Beginning with the path-breaking work of Coe and Helpman (1995), a rich literature now 
exists that shows that important mechanisms for the transmission of knowledge and the increase 
in total factor productivity are the purchase of imported intermediate goods and inward foreign 
direct investment.  The literature shows that for small developing countries, trading with large 
technologically advanced countries is crucial for TFP growth.
21   A summary of this literature is 
                                                            
20 Trade or services liberalization may increase growth indirectly through its positive impact on the development of 
institutions (see Rodrik, Subramananian and Trebbi, 2004).  It may also induce firms to move down their average 
cost curves, or import higher quality products or shift production to more efficient firms within an industry.  Tybout 
and Westbrook (1995) find evidence of this latter type of rationalization for Mexican manufacturing firms. 
21 Schiff et al., (2002, table 1) have shown that for R&D intensive sectors, trade with industrialized countries 
contributes significantly to total factor productivity in developing countries, but trade with developing countries   21 
provided in Jensen and Tarr (2010, Appendix E).  Given the importance of foreign direct 
investment in services in our model, we mention here that Arnold, Mattoo and Javorcik (2007) 
show that in the Czech Republic, services sector liberalization led to increased productivity of 
downstream industries, and the key channel through which reform led to increased productivity 
was allowing foreign entry.  Fernandes and Paunov (2008) found a positive and significant effect 
of foreign direct investment in services on productivity growth in Chile.  Fernandes (2007) finds 
a positive and significant effect of services liberalization in both finance and infrastructure on the 
productivity of downstream manufacturing in the fifteen Eastern European countries. 
In our model, the parameter that reflects the ability of a region to increase total factor 
productivity through the transmission of new technologies is the elasticity of varieties with 
respect to the price.  Based on the literature summary in Jensen and Tarr (2010, Appendix E), we 
assign central values to this elasticity based on the region and the research and development 
intensity of the sector. The assigned central values for these parameters by sector and region are 
in table 6B. We conduct extensive sensitivity analysis on this parameter, both piecemeal and 
systematic.  
  
V.  Data of the Model 
Social Accounting Matrix  
The key data source for our study is the social accounting matrix taken from Kiringai. Thurlow 
and Wanjala (2006). This is a social accounting matrix (SAM) for the year 2003. The table is very rich in 
agricultural detail, with 20 agricultural sectors. Given our focus on services, we found it necessary to 
disaggregate the single transportation sector into five sectors (based on value of output data of the various 
transportation sectors published in the Economic Survey, 2006 for Kenya by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (2007a, p. 198)) and the single financial services sector into insurance, and banking and other 
financial services, from data in Central Bureau of Statistics (2007a, pp. 95-98. We assumed that the input 
output structure for all sectors using these services was identical for the disaggregated sectors. A full 
listing of the sectors and factors of production is provided in table 1. Kiringai et al. (2007) also provide a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
does not. On the other hand, for sectors that are low in R&D intensity, their results suggest that for technology 
diffusion trade with developing countries can be as important as trade with industrialized countries.   22 
set of 20 household accounts integrated into the social accounting matrix. Of these 20 households, ten are 
rural and ten are urban, ranked according to income. Due to some problems with the consistency of the 
household data, however, we employ one representative household in this model. 
.  
Trade Data by Regional Partner and Sector 
 
To obtain the shares of imports and exports from the different regions of our model, we 
used trade data for 2007 obtained from WITS access to the COMTRADE database. The regions 
of our model are Kenya, the European Union, the East African Customs Union plus COMESA 
and the Rest of the World. For the European Union, we took the 27 member countries as of 
2007. In appendix A, we calculate and report data for the East African Customs Union and 
COMESA separately. For the East African Customs Union, we took Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda 
and Burundi. Excluding those East African Customs Union countries that are also COMESA 
members, COMESA includes Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.
22 Trade shares for the ―Africa‖ region in our model are the sum of East Africa 
Customs Union plus COMESA. Rest of the World is the residual.  
We mapped two digit sectors from the COMTRADE database into the sectors of our 
model. The exact mapping is defined in appendix A.  We used Kenya as the reporter country for 
both exports and imports. Results for both exports and imports are reported in tables A2 and A3 
of appendix A.  
 
Tariff Data 
Tariff and Sales Tax Data.  We started with MFN tariff rates at the eight digit level taken from 
the website of the Kenyan government: www.kra.go.ke/customs/customsdownloads.php. These tariff 
rates were then aggregated to the sectors of our model, using simple averages. 
We obtained data on the total taxes on imports and the total value of imports and took the ratio to 
obtain the average value of import taxes in the Kenyan economy. In 2005, this was 8.4 percent.
 23 That is, 
                                                            
22 To avoid double counting we exclude from COMESA the members of the East African Customs Union.  
23 Economic Survey (2006, pp. 103, 115).    23 
on average, Kenyan importers paid 8.4 percent of the value of imports on import taxes that did not apply 
to domestic production. 
As we reported in Balestreri, Rutherford and Tarr (2009), the MFN tariff rates, multiplied times 
the trade flows, exceed the collected tariff rates. That is, using MFN tariff rates for all trade, the weighted 
average tariff rate exceeds the collected tariff rate of 8.4 percent for the economy as a whole. Thus, they 
exaggerate the protection received by Kenyan industry and agriculture. This is due to tariff preferences to 
regional partners and due to other preference items or tariff exemptions. We assume that zero tariffs apply 
on all imports from the East African Customs Union and from COMESA.
 24  Thus, we apply the MFN 
tariff rates only on the trade flows from outside of these African regions (EU and Rest of World in our 
model) and take a weighted average tariff rate of the MFN rates on the non-East African regions.  The 
resulting weighted average tariff rate on non-East African imports still exceeds 8.4 percent. We then equi-
proportionally reduced all the MFN tariffs in our model so that the estimated collected tariffs on imports 
from the EU and Rest of World divided by the total value of import is 8.4 percent. 
 
 
Share of Market Captured by Multinational Service Providers  
It was necessary to calculate the market share of multinational firms in the services 
sectors by region of the model.  Take the banking sector as an example. We need to know the 
share of the market captured by Kenyan, EU, African and Rest of the World firms, where the 
countries in the regions are defined in table 1. This entailed acquiring a list of all banks operating 
in Kenya along with their market share, and, when the bank is owned by multiple parties, 
allocating the ownership across the regions of our model. The database Bankscope was sufficient 
for this task in most cases, but websites of the banks had to be consulted to allocate ownership 
shares in several cases. The results, by region and sector, are presented in table 6. Documentation 
                                                            
24 Kenya agreed to implement zero tariffs on East African Customs Union imports as of January 1, 2005.  
See Michael-Stahl (2005).    24 




Share of Expatriate Labor Employed by Multinational Service Providers 
The impact of liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in business services 
sectors on the demand for labor in these sectors will depend importantly on the share of 
expatriate labor used by multinational firms. We explain in the results section that despite the 
fact that multinationals use Kenyan labor less intensively than their Kenyan competitors, if 
multinationals use mostly Kenyan labor, their expansion is likely to increase the demand for 
Kenyan labor in these sectors.
25  We obtained estimates of the share of expatriate labor or 
specialized technology not available to Kenyan firms that is used by multinational service 
providers in Kenya from the survey mentioned above. We found that multinational service 
providers use mostly local primary factor inputs and only small amounts of expatriate labor or 
specialized technology. Our estimated share of foreign inputs used by multinationals in Kenya is 
presented in the table on sensitivity analysis. 
 
Estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz Elasticities of Substitution for Goods 
It was necessary for us to obtain estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities 
of substitution for the imperfectly competitive sectors in our model. Christian Broda, Joshua 
Greenfield and David Weinstein (2006) estimated Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities of 
substitution at the 3 digit level in 73 countries. Among the 73 countries, there were four in Sub-
Saharan Africa: the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Malawi and Mauritius. We judged 
                                                            
25 See Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2005) for a detailed explanation on why FDI may be a partial equilibrium 
substitute for domestic labor but a general equilibrium complement.    25 
that Madagascar was the country closest in characteristics to Kenya, so we took the values of the 
elasticities estimated for Madagascar as a proxy for the elasticities for Kenya. We explain in 
appendix C, how we mapped the 3 digit elasticities for 130 goods sectors estimated by Broda et 
al. into the sectors of our model. The mapping and resulting elasticities by relevant sector in our 
model are shown in table C1.  
 
VI. Results for Preferential Reduction of All Services Barriers—Central Elasticity Case 
 
We execute several scenarios to assess the impacts of Kenya entering into a bilateral free 
trade agreement that includes services with the European Union, and similarly with the Africa 
region. In these scenarios we assume that Kenyan ad valorem equivalents of the barriers against 
foreign investors in services are reduced by 50 percent with respect to the region with which 
Kenya has an agreement. We assume that Kenya already offers tariff free access to goods 
originating from its African trade partners, so in the scenario where we evaluate the agreement 
with the Africa region we include only liberalization of discriminatory barriers against foreign 
investors in services. Insofar as combining preferential trade agreements could potentially reduce 
trade diversion inherent in separate agreements (see, e.g., Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr, 2002, 
2004), we examine the impacts of the combination of free trade agreements with both the Africa 
region and the European Union. We compare these impacts with unilateral non-discriminatory 
liberalization. Finally, given our earlier result on the importance of reducing non-discriminatory 
barriers against investors in services, we examine the impact of a 50 percent reduction of non-
discriminatory barriers against service providers combined with unilateral liberalization of 
discriminatory barriers.     
  As discussed in Jensen and Tarr (2010), who captures the rents from the barriers is very 
important for the welfare results. Consequently, for each policy scenario, we execute two 
versions of the model with our central elasticities. In one case, we assume that Kenyans do not 
capture any rents from the barriers. In the second scenario, we assume that the discriminatory 
barriers generate rents that are captured by Kenyans.  In our systematic sensitivity analysis, in 
each of the 30,000 scenarios, we allow the share of rents captured by Kenyans to vary   26 
stochastically between zero and one. In a section below, we focus on the impacts in professional 
services by considering the same set of policy experiments where we allow reduction in services 
barriers only in professional services.  
 
Aggregate Effects 
  We first discuss (and present results in tables 7 and 8) our estimates of the full reform 
scenario in our central elasticities case. In these tables we present results on the impacts on 
aggregate variables including welfare, the real exchange rate, aggregate exports and imports, the 
return to capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor and the percentage change in tariff revenue. In 
order to obtain an estimate of the adjustment costs, we estimate the percentage of each of our 
factors of production that have to change industries.  
  Significant gains with the EU—deriving primarily from services liberalization.  We 
estimate that the preferential arrangement with the EU that includes both goods and services 
would generate gains for Kenya of 0.7 percent of consumption with no initial rent capture and 
0.5 percent of consumption if there is initial rent capture by Kenyans. The gains come primarily 
from the preferential liberalization of services, although the relative contribution is much larger 
with no initial rent capture. That is, the gains to Kenya from preferential liberalization of tariffs 
with the EU are invariant to the rent capture assumption at 0.2 percent of consumption. But, if 
there is initial rent capture, the gains to Kenya of preferential liberalization of services fall from 
0.5 percent of consumption to 0.3 percent of consumption. 
  Small gains from preferential liberalization with the Africa region. In the case of 
preferential  liberalization  with  the  Africa  region,  the  gains  are  smaller—0.3  percent  of 
consumption in the case of no initial rent capture and 0.1 percent of consumption in the case of 
rent capture initially by Kenya. The agreement with the EU includes tariff reduction, while tariff 
free access in the Africa region is considered part of the status quo; so the appropriate scenario 
for comparison of the relative gains for Kenya is the scenario in the second column of the results 
tables, labeled ―EU discriminatory services.‖ With no initial rent capture, the gains for Kenya of 
an agreement with the EU are 60 percent greater than the gains from an agreement with the 
Africa region. With initial rent capture, gains of an agreement with the EU are three times greater 
than the gains from an agreement with the Africa region.  We show in the sensitivity section that   27 
there is a possibility of losses from an agreement with the Africa region in the initial rent capture 
case.  
  Why are the gains larger for the agreement with the “northern” region.  As we 
discussed  above,  trade  with  and  FDI  from  large  technologically  advanced  regions  can  be 
expected to lead to technology diffusion that increases total factor productivity. Although trade 
and FDI from small developing countries can contribute to technology diffusion, it has been 
estimated to do so to a significantly lesser extent, at least for research and development intensive 
sectors. The elasticity of the number of varieties (firms) with respect to price is the parameter in 
our model that captures that effect, and the values we have chosen are in table 6B.
26  Table 21 
shows that we estimate that the number of varieties from the EU substantially increases as a 
result  of  preferential  liberalization  with  the  EU,  while  table  18  shows  that  the  estimated 
expansion of varieties from the Africa region is much more modest in response to preferential 
liberalization with respect to the African region.  We show in the sensitivity analysis below that 
this elasticity of supply parameter is very important for the results: preferential agreements in 
services are more likely to be beneficial the higher the supply elasticities of the partner country’s 
services  suppliers  and  the  lower  the  supply  elasticities  of  the  excluded  countries  services 
suppliers.  
More substantial gains from combining the Africa FTA with a FTA with Europe.  In 
tables 7 and 8, in the column labeled ―EU-Africa FTA,‖ we show our estimates for the impacts 
of  agreeing  to  a  FTA  with  both  the  EU  and  the  Africa  region.  The  estimated  gains  are 
approximately the sum  of the separate agreements.  This  shows that  Kenya can significantly 
augment the gains it may realize from an agreement with the Africa region, by adding a FTA 
with the EU.  
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (2002) found that, for Chile, the gains from combining free 
trade agreements would be more than additive. Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr and Gurgel (2004) 
found similar results for Brazil. That is, the gains of the two agreements combined exceeded the 
gains of the two separate agreements. The reason is that if Chile, for example, agreed to a free 
                                                            
26 The elasticity of supply corresponds to the share of the sector’s costs that are due to a specific factor of 
production.  In all of the imperfectly competitive sectors, we assume there are four specific factors: one for each 
region in the model. Then, as industry output expands, the price of the specific factor necessary for production of 
that variety increases, thereby increasing the cost of production of firms. Since the cost of production of firms 
increases as the industry supply increases, the supply curve of each region will slope up in each of these sectors. 
And higher cost shares of the specific factor will lead to less elastic supply curves in that sector.   28 
trade agreement with the U.S., then competition from the U.S. would greatly reduce the trade 
diversion associated with an agreement with neighboring developing countries. But there are the 
possibilities of trade diversion with the rest of the world region, so the gains from combined 
agreements are not necessarily greater than the gains from the separate agreements. 
  Non-discriminatory liberalization would result in a five-fold increase in the gains 
compared  with  preferential  liberalization  with  the  EU.  With  non-discriminatory 
liberalization, Kenyans would be able to access goods and services from the least cost supplier in 
the world. This would eliminate all trade diversion losses, reduce any adverse terms of trade 
losses and result in the maximum number of new foreign varieties for productivity improvement 
from trade and FDI liberalization. Consequently, the gains are much larger in this case.  Because 
the rest of the world has a much larger share of the goods market in Kenya than it enjoys in the 
services sectors, the gains from non-discriminatory liberalization come more from liberalization 
of goods than from services.  
The  largest  gains  come  from  reduction  in  the  barriers  that  domestic  as  well  as 
foreign firms face.    Consistent with the work of Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2009) in a model 
with an aggregate rest of the world, we find that the largest gains for Kenya would come from 
liberalization of the non-discriminatory barriers in services. That is, when we estimate the impact 
of  a  50  percent  reduction  in  the  non-discriminatory  services  barriers  on  top  of  unilateral 
liberalization  of  all  discriminatory  services  barriers,  the  estimated  gains  are  10.3  percent  of 
consumption with no rent capture or 7.0 percent of consumption with initial rent capture.  
 
Sector Impacts 
  In table 9, we present results for the percentage change in output by sector for four 
scenarios: an FTA with the EU; and FTA with the Africa region; and FTA with the EU and the 
Africa region combined; and unilateral liberalization. Details of what is included in these 
scenarios are explained in table 7.   
  In general we see an expansion of the output of the business services sectors in all 
scenarios. Multinational firms in the business services sectors are located in the home country 
and their output is defined as part of industry output. Reduction of barriers against one partner 
generally reduces the number of firms from the other three regions in the model, but on balance 
the output of the sector expands.  To see what happens to EU firms, versus Kenyan and other   29 
firms, it is necessary to view the tables that report the change in the number of firms by scenario.  
  Outside of business services, we estimate that mining, coffee and other manufactured 
food sectors are the sectors that will expand the greatest. These sectors are intensive users of 
business services, such as transportation and banking services. Regulatory reforms will decrease 
the price and allow for quality improvements in these business services, which permits these 
sectors to operate more cheaply and offer better quality services.  
Given that we assume that total employment and the capital stock are fixed in the 
medium term, if labor expands in some sectors, it must contract in other sectors. Given the large 
expansion in several sectors, especially services, we must have declines in others in the medium 
term. Although we estimate small declines in output in several sectors, especially those that use 
business services less intensively, the striking result is that there is very little output decline in 
response to any regional initiative. On the other hand, since we assume zero tariffs in our 
unilateral reform scenario, output declines are much more pronounced in some cases. Sugarcane, 
which is the one of the more highly protected sectors, is estimated to decline substantially along 
with wheat and rice in the unilateral scenario.  The stark result from table 9 is that for sectors that 
experience output declines, the contractions are generally much more moderate in the regional 
preferential scenarios than in the unilateral scenario. This follows from the less substantial drop 
in overall protection to any sector in a preferential trade arrangement. 
 
 
VII. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
  In this section we assess the impact of parameter values and key modeling assumptions 
on the results. Through our ―piecemeal sensitivity analysis‖ we will determine the most 
important parameters for the results, and we will assess how important for the results are rent 
capture or additional varieties from reform in services sectors under increasing returns to scale.  
In the piecemeal sensitivity analysis, we change the value of a single parameter while holding the 
values of all other parameters unchanged at our central elasticity values. We present piecemeal 
sensitivity analysis of the two most relevant policy scenarios. In table 22, we examine the   30 
prospective free trade agreement with the EU, and in table 23, we examine the agreement with 
the Africa region.  
Given uncertainty of parameter values and the rent capture assumption, point estimates of 
the results may be viewed with skepticism. In our ―systematic sensitivity analysis,‖ we execute 
30,000 simulations.  In each simulation, we allow the computer to randomly select the values of 
all parameters, subject to the specified probability distributions of the parameters.  Through the 
systematic sensitivity analysis we will be able to assess how robust the results are and obtain 
confidence intervals of the results.   
 
Rent Capture Assumption 
In the row labeled ―share of rents captured‖ we retain the increasing returns to scale 
assumption in the services sectors and selected goods sectors, but allow the initial rent capture 
share in the services sectors to be either zero (central value ) or 1 (upper value). We see that there 
is approximately a 40 percent reduction in the welfare gain from a free trade agreement with the 
EU if rents are captured initially (from a welfare gain of 0.67 percent of consumption to 0.49 
percent of consumption).  In the case of an agreement with the African region, the gains fall even 
more dramatically, from a welfare gain of 0.25 percent of consumption to a gain of 0.05 percent 
of consumption in our central elasticity case. 
  
Impact of Constant Returns to Scale—Possible Negative Welfare Effects 
  In the row labeled CRTS—share of rents captured—we assume constant returns to scale 
in all sectors, which eliminates the Dixit-Stiglitz externality from additional varieties. We allow 
the initial rent capture share in the services sectors to be either zero (central value) or 1 (upper 
value). We see that without the Dixit-Stiglitz variety externality, the gains from an agreement 
with the EU fall dramatically. With no initial rent capture, the gains for the EU agreement would 
be .09 percent of consumption, and would fall to negative values (-0.06 percent of consumption) 
with initial rent capture. In the case of an agreement with the Africa region, the gains are 0.14 
percent of consumption with no initial rent capture and are negative (-0.06 percent of 
consumption) with initial rent capture.  
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Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis 
  Four parameters stand out as having a strong impact on the results. The elasticity of 
substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive services sectors, ˃(qi, qj) has a 
very strong impact. At the low end of the elasticity range, the estimated gains are almost 10 
percent of consumption from a preferential agreement with the EU and 5 percent of consumption 
from an agreement with the Africa region.  Following from the Le Chatelier principle, larger 
elasticities typically lead to larger welfare gains in response to welfare improving reforms, as the 
economy can adapt more readily.  Unlike other elasticities, however, a lower value of ˃(qi,qj) 
increases the welfare gains. This is because lower values of this elasticity imply that varieties are 
less close to each other, so additional varieties are worth more.  Since the policy shocks in goods 
are much less, the same elasticity variation in goods has a much smaller impact, but its impact is 
nonetheless significant.  The elasticity of substitution between value-added and business 
services, ˃(va, bs), also has a strong  impact. The better firms are able to substitute business 
services for labor and capital, the more the economy will gain from the reforms that reduce the 
quality adjusted price of business services.  Finally, for the agreement with the EU, there is a 
strong impact from changes in the value of ʵEU , the elasticity of multinational service firm 
supply with respect to the price of output. For the agreement with Africa, there is a strong impact 
of the parameter  ʵAFR  .Larger values of this parameter mean that tariff preferences that open 
opportunities for EU service firms to provide new varieties, will not be so quickly choked by the 
increased cost of the specific factor required for EU firm expansion. We investigate the 
sensitivity of the results to changes in the value of this parameter in more detail below.  
 
Impact of Partner and Excluded Country Elasticities of Multinational Service Firm 
Supply—Why It Is More Likely to Obtain Gains from Large Technologically Advanced 
Partners 
In figures 1 and 2, we depict the impact and interrelationship of the elasticities of firm 
supply from partner and excluded countries.  In figure 1, we examine the estimates for the 
welfare effects in Kenya of a 50 percent preferential reduction of barriers in services against 
African partners.  On the vertical axis is the set of elasticities of firm supply of African partners 
with respect to price. We scale this set of elasticities from between one-half to twice their central 
values.  On the horizontal axis we scale the central values of the elasticities of firm supply of all   32 
excluded countries from one-half of their central values to twice their central values.  Excluded 
regions are the EU and Rest of the World.  In figure 2, we do analogous simulations, except that 
since the preferential liberalization is with the EU, the EU elasticities are on the vertical axis and 
we scale the elasticities of the African region and the Rest of the World on the horizontal axis.  
In the left hand side panel, we present results with no initial rent capture, but initial rent capture 
is shown on the right hand side panel. 
Regarding preferential reduction of barriers with African partners, we see in figure 1 that, 
with initial rent capture, there is a significant range of elasticities that result in losses for Kenya. 
Without initial rent capture, however, there are gains for all these values.  
 We see from figures 1 and 2 that the gains to the home country increase the higher the 
elasticity of supply of firms in partner countries and the lower the elasticity of supply of firms in 
excluded countries, with the partner country elasticity being by far the more important.  
Preferential reduction of barriers, leads to an increase in firms (varieties) and productivity from 
partner countries, but a loss of service providers (varieties) from all excluded regions and the 
home country, results in a loss of productivity for sectors using these services.  The lost 
productivity from lost varieties from the regions excluded and the home country from the 
preferential liberalization in services is analogous to the trade diversion losses in perfect 
competition.  When firm elasticities in partner countries are high, the after tax price increase for 
firms in partner countries from preferential reduction of barriers induces a large increase in 
partner country varieties, boosting productivity.  For excluded countries, the price decrease of 
partner countries shifts in demand for their products and lowers their price; but the lower price 
induces fewer lost varieties when firms in excluded countries have low elasticities.  In addition to 
the variety impacts in imperfect competition, as explained above, in perfect competition the rent 
and terms of trade impacts reinforce the argument that high elasticities of partners and low 
elasticities of excluded countries increase the likelihood of welfare gains from a preferential 
agreement in services. 
  
Systematic Sensitivity Analysis  
  In the systematic sensitivity analysis, we execute the model 30,000 times and harvest the 
results for desired variables. In each individual simulation, we allow the computer to select 
values of all the parameters in the model (the parameters in table 22), based on the specified   33 
probability density functions (pdfs) of the parameters. We assume uniform probability density 
functions, with upper and lower values of the pdfs given by the upper and lower values in the 
piecemeal sensitivity analysis table. We include initial rent capture in the systematic sensitivity 
analysis, with the rent capture parameter allowed to take values between zero and one with a 
uniform pdf.   
  The results for preferential reduction of barriers with African partners on welfare, output 
and labor are shown in figures 3-5 and similar figures for the preferential trade agreement with 
the EU in figures 6-8.. The sample distribution of the welfare results for preferential reduction of 
barriers in services with the Africa region is depicted in figure 3. We find that in 1.9 percent of 
the 30,000 simulations yield a negative welfare result, which we interpret as a 1.9 percent 
probability that preferential liberalization with the Africa region will yield a negative result. A 95 
percent confidence interval for equivalent variation as a percent of consumption is: 0.008 to 
0.417 around a sample mean of .203.
27 
  The sample distribution of the welfare results for a free trade agreement with the EU that 
includes services are depicted in figure 6.  In the 30,000 simulations, there are no negative 
values. A 95 percent confidence interval for equivalent variation as a percent of consumption is: 
0.37 to 0.94 around a sample mean of 0.63.
28  
In figures 4 and 7, we show ―box and whisper‖ diagrams for the sample distribution of 
the percentage change in output by sector.  Sectors are on the horizontal axis and the percentage 
change in output is shown on the vertical axis. The bars in the box are the means of the 
distributions. Fifty percent confidence intervals are depicted by the boxes, while the vertical lines 
show 95 percent confidence intervals.  
The means of the systematic sensitivity results show a similar pattern to the point 
estimates regarding the expansion of the services sectors. While the confidence intervals are 
rather tight for most sectors, they reveal a large range of uncertainty for several sectors. With 
respect to the EU agreement, while the sign of the direction of change does not change within the 
95 percent confidence interval, the confidence intervals of expected output change are large for 
other manufactured food, maritime transportation, coffee and mining (among the expanding 
sectors) and sugarcane, non-metallic products and other manufactures (on the negative side). For 
                                                            
27 90 percent and 99 percent confidence intervals are 0.033 to 0.384 and -0.029 to 0.479, respectively.     
28 90 and 99 percent confidence intervals are 0.41 to .89 and 0.30 to 1.07, respectively.    34 
several sectors, where the mean change in output is close to zero, notably wood and paper, and 
chemicals, 95 percent confidence intervals reveal that the estimated sign of the change is not 
robust. For the Africa agreement, it is remarkable how tight the 95 percent confidence intervals 
are for those sectors where the mean predicted change is small (with the exception again of wood 
and paper). Confidence intervals are much less tight for sectors with significant predicted 
changes, but the sign of the change does not change throughout the confidence intervals.  
 
VIII. Results for Preferential Reduction of Barriers in Professional Services Liberalization 
   
In these scenarios we consider the impact of a preferential reduction in barriers in 
professional services, but assume that there is no reduction of barriers in other services sectors. 
We execute the same policy scenarios that we executed in the earlier section, where all services 
barriers are reduced on a preferential basis. The results are shown in tables 24-26. In table 24, we 
assume no initial rent capture, but in table 25, we assume initial rent capture.  
We find that preferential liberalization of professional services with respect to its African 
regional partners would result in small positive welfare gains (0.02 percent of consumption) in 
the case of no initial rent capture, but virtually no welfare impact with initial rent capture.
29  But, 
it may be seen as positive if it is an important first step toward wider liberalization. Preferential 
liberalization of professional services with the EU will yield positive gains of 0.06 percent of 
consumption (in the no initial rent capture case).  If liberalization in professional services is 
extended to all foreign partners (called ―unilateral‖ in the tables), the gains would increase to 
0.16 percent of consumption..  Thus, these results suggest that preferential liberalization in the 
region may be a useful, but wider liberalization, with larger partners or multilaterally will yield 
much larger gains.  
Finally, we estimate that the largest gains in professional services reform would come 
from a serious effort to reduce non-discriminatory regulatory barriers (that is, barriers that raise 
                                                            
29 Taken to a third decimal place, the impact is negative with initial rent capture.    35 
the costs of Kenyans as well as foreign professional services providers in Kenya). This would 
more than quadruple the benefits of multilateral liberalization in Kenya. These results are 
consistent with the work of Dihel et al., (2010). They have documented extensive regulatory 
barriers in professional services in Kenya and other East African countries that prevent entry of 
potential suppliers and limit competition among existing professional service suppliers.  
As we mentioned in section III, we used engineering services as a proxy for all services 
when we estimated the barriers and calculated the market shares of different regions. Experts in 
this field in East Africa have suggested that engineering services are likely less constrained than 
some other services, notably legal services. This would imply that the ad valorem equivalents of 
the barriers would be higher if averaged with the other more protected sectors, and the gains 
from non-discriminatory liberalization would be higher. In some other sectors, like accounting, 
there is a much greater foreign presence.  With higher barriers, discriminatory liberalization with 
the Africa region in accounting could displace a larger number of varieties in a sector like 




In this paper we have developed an innovative small open economy computable general 
equilibrium model of the Kenyan economy that is capable of assessing the impact of the 
preferential liberalization of barriers against multinational service providers. We have provided a 
discussion of the welfare economics of services liberalization, in which we argue that it is likely 
that the gains from preferential reduction of barriers against multinational services will be larger 
if the partner region is large. We find that gains to Kenya from preferential reduction of barriers 
in services with the Africa region are negligible, and could be negative under some plausible 
parameter assumptions.  We show that under imperfect competition with the Dixit-Stiglitz   36 
variety externality, welfare losses from preferential reduction of services barriers are possible 
due to a loss of varieties from excluded countries. Gains from a free trade agreement with the EU 
that includes a preferential 50 percent reduction in the ad valorem equivalents of the barriers in 
the services sectors will produce significant gains for Kenya, deriving primarily from services 
commitments. Kenyan gains from liberalization with the EU region are considerably larger than 
the gains from an agreement with the African region because a small increase in the price to EU 
producers can be expected to induce a relatively large increase in the number of varieties. In 
addition, when rents are captured initially, the terms of trade loss on partner services and the lost 
rents on services from the Rest of the World are larger when partners have low supply 
elasticities. We have conducted extensive sensitivity analysis to determine confidence intervals 
for the results and found plausible ranges of key parameters that lead to estimated losses for 
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Table 1 -- List of Sectors in the Kenya Model 
Business Services  Agriculture (CRTS) 
Communication  Maize 
Insurance  Wheat 
Banking and other financial services  Rice 
Professional business services  Barley 
Road services  Cotton 
Railway transport  Other cereals 
Maritime transport  Sugarcane 
Pipeline transport  Coffee 
Airline transport  Tea 
   Roots & tubers 
IRTS Goods  Pulses & oil seeds 
Beverages & tobacco  Fruits 
Grain milling  Vegetables 
Sugar & bakery & confectionary  Cut flowers 
Petroleum  Others crops 
Chemicals  Beef 
Metals and machines  Dairy 
Non metallic products  Poultry 
   Sheep goat and lamb for slaughter 
Factors of Production  Other livestock 
Skilled labor    
Semi-skilled labor  Other CRTS 
Unskilled labor  Fishing 
Capital  Forestry 
Land  Mining 
   Meat & dairy 
Regions  Other manufactured food 
Kenya  Textile & clothing 
Africa (East African Customs Union + COMESA)  Leather & footwear 
EU (27)   Wood & paper 
Rest of World  Printing and publishing 
   Other manufactures 
   Water 
   Electricity 
   Construction 
   Trade 
 
Hotels 
   Real estate 
   Adminsitration 
   Health 
   Education 
 
Note: East African Custom Union includes (besides Kenya) Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.  COMESA includes 
Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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Table 2 -- Sectoral value-added (%, unless otherwise indicated) 
      Labor        GDP   







Capital  Land  BKS (Billions 
of Kenyan 
Shillings) 
% of total 
 
Business Services                        
   Communication  3.7  19.7  13.7  62.9     30.6  3.1   
   Insurance  1.2  5.4  19.3  74.0     21.1  2.2   
   Banking and other financial services  1.2  5.4  19.3  74.0     45.7  4.7   
   Professional business services  23.1  4.4  14.3  58.3     94.5  9.7   
   Road services  9.9  34.6  5.5  50.0     42.0  4.3   
   Railway transport  9.9  34.6  5.5  50.0     1.2  0.1   
   Maritime transport  9.9  34.6  5.5  50.0     4.6  0.5   
   Pipeline transport  9.9  34.6  5.5  50.0     2.1  0.2   
   Airline transport  9.9  34.6  5.5  50.0     16.9  1.7   
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods                        
   Beverages & tobacco     0.7  34.0  65.2     13.7  1.4   
   Grain milling  2.1  9.5  2.9  85.5     9.6  1.0   
   Sugar & bakery & confectionary  7.9  36.8  11.7  43.6     4.4  0.5   
   Petroleum     0.4  1.3  98.4     3.9  0.4   
   Chemicals  16.4  5.4  29.7  48.5     7.1  0.7   
   Metals and machines  2.8  55.0  2.9  39.2     8.2  0.8   
   Non metallic products  0.5  9.8     89.7     23.1  2.4   
Agriculture                        
   Maize  10.7  48.0  0.2  10.7  30.4  28.9  3.0   
   Wheat  0.7  25.0     20.6  53.7  0.4  0.0   
   Rice  24.8  21.2     22.6  31.3  1.1  0.1   
   Barley  1.1  24.9     20.6  53.4  0.7  0.1   
   Cotton  17.4  26.3  0.1  12.7  43.5  0.3  0.0   
   Other cereals  8.6  24.6  0.2  23.5  43.2  0.1  0.0   
   Sugarcane  7.6  37.6  0.3  11.5  43.1  1.8  0.2   
   Coffee  14.6  30.1  0.2  12.2  42.8  5.6  0.6   
   Tea  13.9  45.3  0.2  10.6  30.0  35.0  3.6   
   Roots & tubers  11.6  38.3  0.3  31.9  18.0  10.0  1.0   
   Pulses & oil seeds  12.0  38.0  0.5  11.9  37.7  19.0  1.9   
   Fruits  15.3  34.0  0.2  10.6  39.9  13.5  1.4   
   Vegetables  14.7  38.7  0.3  29.8  16.5  22.0  2.2   
   Cut flowers  35.2  19.7  0.1  10.3  34.7  11.7  1.2   
   Others crops  15.3  36.5  0.6  27.3  20.3  7.3  0.7   
   Beef  24.8  36.2  0.5  38.5     13.9  1.4   
   Dairy  26.1  35.7  0.2  38.1     23.6  2.4   
   Poultry  15.3  43.4  0.8  40.5     15.2  1.6   
   Sheep goat and lamb for slaughter  28.2  36.9  0.2  34.6     5.1  0.5   
   Other livestock  6.5  35.4  0.2  58.0     3.8  0.4   
Other CRTS                        
   Fishing  3.7  7.4     88.8     3.9  0.4     45 
 
 
Table 2 -- Sectoral value-added (%, unless otherwise indicated) continue   
   Forestry  3.1  23.2     73.7     7.0  0.7   
   Mining  16.4  30.9     52.7     3.2  0.3   
   Meat & dairy  3.2  27.6  0.0  69.2     11.9  1.2   
   Other manufactured food  8.3  36.1  0.5  55.1     0.9  0.1   
   Printing and publishing     44.8     55.2     5.7  0.6   
   Textile & clothing  57.0  9.3  0.6  33.1     5.4  0.6   
   Leather & footwear  13.9  2.3     83.9     5.2  0.5   
   Wood & paper  4.4  7.1  27.1  61.4     2.9  0.3   
   Other manufactures  3.3  63.9  0.6  32.3     29.8  3.0   
   Water     28.8  10.9  60.3     13.1  1.3   
   Electricity  0.7  25.4  1.5  72.3     12.9  1.3   
   Construction  1.5  14.9  2.5  81.1     51.8  5.3   
   Trade  16.6  5.6  7.0  70.8     63.6  6.5   
   Hotels  51.1  5.0  0.9  43.1     9.8  1.0   
   Real estate  0.3  29.8  13.0  57.0     56.2  5.8   
 
Adminsitration  1.1  12.1  8.0  78.8     49.3  5.1   
 
Health  1.6  2.6  92.5  3.2     21.2  2.2   
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Table 3 -- Trade Flows                      
      Imports     Exports 
      BKS  % of total  % of supply     BKS  % of total  % of output 
Business Services                      
   Communication              1.9  0.8  4.1 
   Insurance  2.4  0.7  7.5     0.4  0.2  1.5 
   Banking and other financial services  5.1  1.5  7.6     0.9  0.4  1.5 
   Professional business services                      
   Road services  29.9  9.0  30.7     20.3  8.3  23.1 
   Railway transport  1.0  0.3  29.7             
   Maritime transport  3.7  1.1  29.8     2.6  1.1  23.1 
   Pipeline transport  1.7  0.5  29.7     1.2  0.5  23.1 
   Airline transport  12.9  3.9  30.1     9.0  3.7  23.1 
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods                      
   Beverages & tobacco  1.4  0.4  5.1     12.1  4.9  30.4 
   Grain milling  0.7  0.2  2.1             
   Sugar & bakery & confectionary  2.9  0.9  14.6     2.0  0.8  10.8 
   Petroleum  60.0  18.0  56.8     14.7  6.0  49.0 
   Chemicals  50.4  15.1  67.2     12.9  5.2  71.2 
   Metals and machines  48.0  14.4  69.4     5.0  2.0  55.8 
   Non metallic products  2.9  0.9  8.7     3.8  1.5  11.1 
Agriculture                      
   Maize  0.7  0.2  2.0     0.3  0.1  0.6 
   Wheat  10.9  3.3  96.1     0.1  0.0  14.6 
   Rice  3.9  1.2  53.7             
   Barley              0.1  0.0  11.0 
   Cotton              0.0  0.0  7.4 
   Other cereals              0.0  0.0  41.2 
   Sugarcane  1.5  0.4  42.5     1.5  0.6  33.7 
   Coffee              11.7  4.8  86.6 
   Tea  0.4  0.1  9.0     47.1  19.1  91.5 
   Roots & tubers                      
   Pulses & oil seeds  0.5  0.1  3.4     8.1  3.3  38.3 
   Fruits              2.0  0.8  18.2 
   Vegetables  0.5  0.1  2.7     7.9  3.2  31.0 
   Cut flowers              21.3  8.7  98.4 
   Others crops  0.7  0.2  6.0     4.5  1.8  29.9 
   Beef                      
   Dairy                      
   Poultry                      
   Sheep goat and lamb for slaughter                      
   Other livestock                      
Other CRTS                      
   Fishing                      
   Forestry                      
   Mining  0.4  0.1  31.5     6.1  2.5  95.2 
   Meat & dairy  1.0  0.3  2.9     12.8  5.2  25.7 
   Other manufactured food  22.9  6.8  76.4     2.8  1.2  69.6 
   Printing and publishing  11.1  3.3  34.9             
   Textile & clothing  9.4  2.8  43.6     4.4  1.8  31.2 
   Leather & footwear  1.6  0.5  9.9     3.5  1.4  20.4 
   Wood & paper  2.9  0.9  43.4     8.4  3.4  88.9 
   Other manufactures  35.4  10.6  43.9     14.7  6.0  22.2 
   Water                      
   Electricity                      
   Construction                      
   Trade                      
   Hotels                      
   Real estate  7.4  2.2  10.1     1.5  0.6  2.3 
   Adminsitration                      
   Health                      
   Education                      
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Table 4 -- Benchmark Distortions (%) 
            Regulatory barriers 
      Tariff  Sales Tax  All firms  Foreign firms 
Business Services             
   Communication        6.0  4.0 
   Insurance     0.6  13.0  26.0 
   Banking and other financial services     0.6  17.0    
   Professional business services        3.7  11.9 
   Road services        15.0  30.0 
   Railway transport        25.0    
   Maritime transport        57.0  40.0 
   Pipeline transport             
   Airline transport        2.0  2.0 
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods             
   Beverages & tobacco  30.4  44.0       
   Grain milling  25.8  9.4       
   Sugar & bakery & confectionary  23.5  19.5       
   Petroleum  10.4  22.4       
   Chemicals  8.8  4.8       
   Metals and machines  9.5  5.2       
   Non metallic products  19.3  0.7       
Agriculture             
   Maize  29.6          
   Wheat  11.0          
   Rice  27.6          
   Barley  9.9          
   Cotton  12.5  12.5       
   Other cereals  9.9          
   Sugarcane  64.2  19.4       
   Coffee  19.7          
   Tea  19.7  5.1       
   Roots & tubers             
   Pulses & oil seeds  6.7  0.0       
   Fruits  19.5          
   Vegetables  19.7  0.1       
   Cut flowers  19.7          
   Others crops  2.7  3.4       
   Beef  19.7          
   Dairy  28.9          
   Poultry  19.7          
   Sheep goat and lamb for slaughter             
   Other livestock  19.7          
Other CRTS             
   Fishing  19.7          
   Forestry             
   Mining  1.2  4.1       
   Meat & dairy  27.6  15.5       
   Other manufactured food  15.8  5.5       
   Printing and publishing     12.1       
   Textile & clothing  14.4  8.5       
   Leather & footwear  13.8  14.5       
   Wood & paper  9.2  5.9       
   Other manufactures  17.2  3.0       
   Water             
   Electricity             
   Construction             
   Trade     1.9       
   Hotels     13.9       
   Real estate             
   Adminsitration             
   Health             
   Education             
Source:  Authors' estimates.  See Balistreri, Rutherford, and Tarr (2009) for details. 
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Table 5 -- Trade Flows by Trading 
Partner (%)                      
        Imports           Exports    
      European Union  Africa  Rest of the World     European Union  Africa  Rest of the World 
Business Services                      
   Communication              66  0  34 
   Insurance  23  0  77     23  0  77 
   Banking and other financial services  75  1  24     75  1  24 
   Professional business services                      
   Road services  10  70  20     10  70  20 
   Railway transport  0  0  100             
   Maritime transport  45  27  27     45  27  27 
   Pipeline transport  0  41  59     0  41  59 
   Airline transport  43  14  43     43  14  43 
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods                      
   Beverages & tobacco  23  58  20     7  57  37 
   Grain milling  13  32  55             
   Sugar & bakery & confectionary  20  15  65     3  73  24 
   Petroleum  3  2  94     0  58  41 
   Chemicals  28  6  66     0  69  30 
   Metals and machines  27  2  70     3  78  19 
   Non metallic products  24  4  72     5  86  9 
Agriculture                      
   Maize  0  91  9     0  27  73 
   Wheat  3  0  97     0  28  72 
   Rice  0  16  84             
   Barley              0  100  0 
   Cotton              12  2  86 
   Other cereals              1  64  35 
   Sugarcane  4  65  31     0  98  2 
   Coffee              59  1  40 
   Tea  0  1  99     19  24  57 
   Roots & tubers                      
   Pulses & oil seeds  1  76  24     60  2  38 
   Fruits              76  6  18 
   Vegetables  11  43  46     89  2  9 
   Cut flowers              81  6  13 
   Others crops  14  58  28     15  53  32 
   Beef                      
   Dairy                      
   Poultry                      
   Sheep goat and lamb for slaughter                      
   Other livestock                      
Other CRTS                      
   Fishing                      
   Forestry                      
   Mining  5  5  90     28  43  29 
   Meat & dairy  12  17  71     1  74  26 
   Other manufactured food  7  16  77     34  56  10 
   Printing and publishing  35  19  45             
   Textile & clothing  3  7  89     1  18  80 
   Leather & footwear  3  1  96     18  48  35 
   Wood & paper  34  16  50     4  87  10 
   Other manufactures  36  2  61     14  70  17 
   Water                      
   Electricity                      
   Construction                      
   Trade                      
   Hotels                      
   Real estate  33  33  33     33  33  33 
   Adminsitration                      
   Health                      
   Education                      
Source:  Authors' estimates.                      
 
 






Table 6A -- Market Shares in Sectors with FDI (%)       
                   
                   
      Kenya 
European 
Union  Africa 
Rest of the 
World   
                   
Business Services               
   Communication  26  49  0  25   
   Insurance  85  4  0  11   
  
Banking and other financial 
services  62  29  0  9   
   Professional business services  94  2  2  2   
   Road services  80  2  14  4   
   Railway transport  0  0  0  100   
   Maritime transport  45  25  15  15   
   Pipeline transport  70  0  13  18   
   Airline transport  30  30  10  30   
Source: Authors' estimates.  See appendix for 
details.             
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telecommunications 52-high 2.5 13.4 20
banking  4-low 3.3 3.3 10
insurance 4-low 3.3 3.3 10
professional services 116-high 2.5 13.4 20
air transport** medium 1.9 10 15
road transport low 3.3 3.3 10
rail transport** medium 1.9 10 15
water transport** medium 1.9 10 15
MANUFACTURING
beverages and tabacco 14-low 3.3 3.3 10
grain milling*** 7-low 3.3 3.3 10
sugar&bakery&confectioners*** 7-low 3.3 3.3 10
petroleum 2-low 3.3 3.3 10
chemicals 34-medium 1.9 10 15
metals and machines*** 33-medium 1.9 10 15
non-metallic products*** 0-17-low 3.3 3.3 10
SOURCE:  R&D and sales data from National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Industrial Research and 
Development:  2005, Data Tables . Available at:  http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf10319/content.cfm?pub_id=3750&id=3. See appendix E for 
details of the calculations.
R&D expenditures divided by 
sales (times 1000) for the US*
*Based on average R&D expenditures for the years 2004 and 2005. The average for all US industries was 36. 
***Food is the proxy for grain mlling and sugar, bakery and confectioners; machinery is used for metals and machines; for non-metallic products, 
we used plastics, rubber, mineral and wood products.
**We evaluate transportation as a medium R&D sector since three sectrors dominate R&D expenditures of US multinationals operating abroad. 
These are transportation, chemiicals and computers and electronics. Moreover, about two-thirds of all R&D expenditures of foreign 
multinationals operatingi in the US was performed in the same three sectors. See "U.S. and International Research and Development: Funds and 
Technology Linkages," at  'http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/c4/c4s5.htm.
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Table 7: Summary of Results (results are percentage change from initial equilibrium, unless otherwise indicated)
No initial rent capture case
Scenario definition Benchmark EU FTA
EU 
Discriminatory 












50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on African services firms No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms No No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms No No No No No No No No No Yes
Removal of tariffs on EU sourced goods No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Removal of tariffs on ROW sourced goods No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.3 1.0 3.6 1.5 2.0 10.3
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.8 3.0 1.3 1.7 8.6
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 3.6 2.1 2.9 2.1 2.9 2.1 2.9
Tariff revenue -29.0 -0.1 -28.9 -0.1 -29.1 -100.0 -0.3 -100.0 -100.0
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.2 1.2 4.0 0.9 3.1 5.8
Aggregate exports  3.2 0.1 3.1 0.3 3.5 12.6 0.5 11.9 15.4
Factor Earnings
Skilled labor 2.2 0.7 1.5 0.5 2.7 9.0 2.2 6.5 15.3
Semi-skilled labor 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.3 1.4 5.6 1.5 4.1 10.3
Unskilled labor 1.5 0.6 0.9 0.3 1.9 7.4 1.9 5.3 14.3
Capital 1.5 0.5 0.9 0.3 1.8 7.0 1.7 5.1 12.4
Land 2.6 0.4 2.2 0.5 3.0 7.7 1.4 6.1 10.0
Factor adjustments
Skilled labor 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.7 2.1 0.9 1.3 4.2
Semi-skilled labor 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.8 2.5 0.6 1.9 4.5
Unskilled labor 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.5 1.3
Capital 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 1.3 0.3 1.2 2.2
Land 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.4 1.4 3.7 1.4 2.2 7.2
Source: Authors' estimates.  52 
 
 
   
Table 8: Summary of Results (results are percentage change from initial equilibrium, unless otherwise indicated)
Initial Rent Capture Case
Scenario definition Benchmark EU FTA
EU 
Discriminatory 












50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on African services firms No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms No No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms No No No No No No No No No Yes
Removal of tariffs on EU sourced goods No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Removal of tariffs on ROW sourced goods No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 2.9 0.9 2.0 7.0
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.5 2.5 0.7 1.7 5.9
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 3.6 2.1 2.9 2.1 2.9 2.1 2.9
Tariff revenue -29.0 -0.1 -28.9 -0.1 -29.1 -100.0 -0.4 -100.0 -100.0
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.2 1.1 4.0 0.9 3.1 5.5
Aggregate exports  3.2 0.1 3.1 0.2 3.4 12.4 0.4 11.9 14.3
Factor Earnings
Skilled labor 2.2 0.7 1.5 0.5 2.7 8.9 2.2 6.5 14.7
Semi-skilled labor 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.3 1.4 5.6 1.5 4.1 10.0
Unskilled labor 1.5 0.6 0.9 0.3 1.8 7.4 1.9 5.3 14.6
Capital 1.4 0.5 0.9 0.3 1.7 6.9 1.6 5.1 12.2
Land 2.5 0.3 2.2 0.4 2.9 7.5 1.1 6.1 8.5
Factor adjustments
Skilled labor 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.9 2.3 1.1 1.3 5.0
Semi-skilled labor 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.9 2.5 0.8 1.9 4.9
Unskilled labor 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.5 2.0
Capital 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 1.4 0.4 1.2 2.7
Land 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.4 1.4 3.7 1.5 2.2 7.2
Source: Authors' estimates.  53 
 
Table 9: Output and Employment Impacts from Liberalisation (% change from benchmark)
No initial rent capture case
Unilateral FTA EU-Africa FTA Africa FTA EU FTA
Output Labor income Output Labor income Output Labor income Output Labor income
Business Services
Communication 3.0 8.3 1.1 2.3 0.2 0.3 0.9 2.0
Insurance 4.1 9.8 0.9 2.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.6
Banking and other financial services 2.4 7.7 0.9 2.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.7
Professional business services 4.1 10.5 1.5 3.1 0.2 0.4 1.3 2.6
Road services 6.5 9.4 2.8 3.0 0.4 0.5 2.3 2.4
Railway transport 12.6 14.3 6.1 5.7 1.8 1.4 4.2 4.2
Maritime transport 14.3 16.8 8.2 8.2 -0.2 -0.6 8.2 8.7
Pipeline transport 5.5 7.0 2.7 2.3 0.8 0.4 1.9 1.9
Airline transport 6.6 8.4 3.2 2.8 0.9 0.4 2.3 2.4
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 6.2 12.1 0.6 1.9 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.6
Grain milling 2.7 10.0 0.5 2.4 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.9
Sugar & bakery & confectionary -2.4 4.0 0.4 2.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 1.7
Petroleum 0.7 3.5 3.4 4.0 0.2 0.2 3.2 3.7
Chemicals 1.5 7.3 -0.4 1.0 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.7
Metals and machines -8.4 -3.3 -3.7 -2.5 0.0 0.3 -3.7 -2.7
Non metallic products -14.2 -9.7 -1.0 0.6 0.0 0.3 -1.0 0.3
Agriculture
Maize 1.7 7.1 0.6 2.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.8
Wheat -27.7 -24.9 -2.7 -0.9 -0.2 0.1 -2.4 -1.0
Rice -29.8 -27.0 0.6 2.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.7
Barley 3.3 10.0 0.1 2.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 1.8
Cotton 2.5 7.6 0.5 1.9 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.6
Other cereals -2.1 3.9 -0.9 1.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.6 0.9
Sugarcane -31.0 -30.2 -3.2 -3.4 2.3 1.9 -5.5 -5.4
Coffee 52.4 60.9 15.5 17.4 0.4 0.7 15.1 16.8
Tea -7.3 -2.1 -1.6 0.0 -1.2 -1.0 -0.3 1.1
Roots & tubers 0.6 4.9 0.3 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.1
Pulses & oil seeds 0.3 5.7 0.1 1.7 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.4
Fruits -0.4 5.0 -0.1 1.4 0.1 0.3 -0.2 1.1
Vegetables -0.7 4.8 0.3 1.8 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.5
Cut flowers 21.1 27.1 11.2 12.7 4.8 4.9 6.1 7.4
Others crops 1.0 5.6 1.2 2.5 0.1 0.3 1.2 2.2
Beef 2.2 9.3 0.6 2.5 0.0 0.4 0.6 2.1
Dairy 0.4 7.1 0.1 1.9 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.5
Poultry 0.6 7.1 0.1 1.8 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.5
Sheep goat and lamb for slaughter 0.9 7.9 0.1 2.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 1.7
Other livestock -0.5 6.1 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.3 -0.1 1.3
Other CRTS
Fishing 0.3 7.3 -0.1 1.7 0.0 0.4 -0.1 1.3
Forestry 0.1 6.8 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.4
Mining 81.3 96.4 9.0 10.8 0.8 1.0 8.1 9.7
Meat & dairy 7.1 13.6 0.9 2.4 0.1 0.3 0.8 2.0
Other manufactured food 49.6 63.3 8.1 10.5 0.7 1.1 7.4 9.3
Printing and publishing 6.2 12.6 0.8 2.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.8
Textile & clothing -4.4 3.1 -0.1 2.2 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 1.8
Leather & footwear 4.7 12.8 0.4 2.3 0.0 0.4 0.4 2.0
Wood & paper 4.3 11.6 -0.8 0.8 0.1 0.5 -0.9 0.4
Other manufactures -12.1 -7.3 -6.2 -5.1 0.0 0.3 -6.3 -5.4
Water -0.5 5.9 0.1 1.8 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.4
Electricity 0.5 6.7 0.4 1.9 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.5
Construction 0.0 6.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.2
Trade 3.4 7.6 1.1 2.0 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.7
Hotels 0.4 5.6 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.1
Real estate -2.3 3.5 -0.5 1.0 0.0 0.3 -0.5 0.7
Adminsitration 0.0 6.4 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.3
Health -0.3 7.0 -0.2 1.6 0.0 0.3 -0.2 1.3
Education -0.3 6.7 -0.1 1.7 0.0 0.3 -0.1 1.4
Source: Authors' estimates.  54 
 
Table 10: Impacts on Imports from Unilateral Liberalisation (% change from benchmark)
No initial rent capture case
European 
Union Africa





Banking and other financial services 3.4 3.4 3.9
Professional business services
Road services -6.3 -6.3 -4.2
Railway transport -3.0
Maritime transport -20.9 -25.2 -19.1
Pipeline transport -0.9 -0.5
Airline transport -2.6 -3.2 -2.4
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 67.0 -6.6 148.7
Grain milling 59.6 -13.9 218.3
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 43.7 -20.8 118.6
Petroleum 2.8 -25.4 6.5
Chemicals 5.1 -14.2 6.0
Metals and machines 6.0 -19.8 9.1
Non metallic products 37.4 -24.2 187.9
Agriculture
Maize 173.2 -3.1 173.2
Wheat 4.2 -31.4 4.2




Sugarcane 216.2 -56.5 216.2
Coffee
Tea 58.3 -22.9 58.3
Roots & tubers
Pulses & oil seeds 31.3 1.4 31.3
Fruits
Vegetables 98.7 -3.2 98.7
Cut flowers









Mining -26.0 -29.4 -26.0
Meat & dairy 107.8 -21.6 107.8
Other manufactured food 16.5 -35.3 16.5
Printing and publishing -3.4 -3.4 -3.4
Textile & clothing 29.2 -24.5 29.2
Leather & footwear 44.1 -14.1 44.1
Wood & paper 17.9 -17.2 17.9










Source: Authors' estimates.  55 
 
Table 11: Impacts on Exports from Unilateral Liberalisation (% change from benchmark)
No initial rent capture case
European 
Union Africa





Banking and other financial services -1.6 -1.6 -1.6
Professional business services
Road services 5.1 5.1 5.1
Railway transport 23.8
Maritime transport 3.4 3.4 3.4
Pipeline transport 6.8 6.8
Airline transport 6.4 6.4 6.4
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 13.8 13.8 13.8
Grain milling
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 15.0 15.0 15.0
Petroleum 16.2 16.2 16.2
Chemicals 7.5 7.5 7.5
Metals and machines 52.8 52.8 52.8
Non metallic products 20.1 20.1 20.1
Agriculture




Cotton 1.9 1.9 1.9
Other cereals -5.1 -5.1 -5.1
Sugarcane -15.5 -15.5 -15.5
Coffee 55.7 55.7 55.7
Tea -7.0 -7.0 -7.0
Roots & tubers
Pulses & oil seeds -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
Fruits -3.3 -3.3 -3.3
Vegetables -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
Cut flowers 21.4 21.4 21.4









Mining 85.2 85.2 85.2
Meat & dairy 23.5 23.5 23.5
Other manufactured food 77.4 77.4 77.4
Printing and publishing
Textile & clothing 6.6 6.6 6.6
Leather & footwear 18.1 18.1 18.1
Wood & paper 5.5 5.5 5.5










Source: Authors' estimates.  56 
 
 
   
Table 12: Impacts on Number of Firms from Unilateral Liberalisation (% change from benchmark)




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Communication -1.8 5.3 6.2
Insurance -6.3 33.4 91.4
Banking and other financial services 1.4 1.7 1.7 3.5
Professional business services 1.1 50.7 13.7 61.1
Road services -0.3 39.8 39.7 128.3
Railway transport 7.5
Maritime transport -9.0 86.4 16.7 115.9
Pipeline transport 3.9 3.0 12.2
Airline transport 3.3 9.1 2.7 11.1
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 5.5 50.6 -5.4 116.4
Grain milling 2.2 45.5 -11.5 169.9
Sugar & bakery & confectionary -2.3 33.4 -17.1 92.2
Petroleum 0.6 2.2 -20.6 5.1
Chemicals 1.4 3.9 -11.3 4.7
Metals and machines -7.3 4.6 -15.9 7.0
Non metallic products -10.5 28.9 -20.1 144.9
Source: Authors' estimates.  57 
 
Table 13: Impacts on Imports from combined EU and Aftrica FTAs 
No initial rent capture case  (% change from benchmark)
European 
Union Africa





Banking and other financial services 0.6 0.6 0.8
Professional business services
Road services -3.5 -3.5 -4.3
Railway transport -1.9
Maritime transport -11.8 -18.1 -20.7
Pipeline transport -0.8 -0.7
Airline transport -1.4 -1.9 -1.8
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 75.3 -1.5 -2.5
Grain milling 79.3 -1.7 -3.4
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 72.5 -3.6 -7.0
Petroleum 36.0 -0.8 -1.7
Chemicals 43.7 -4.4 -14.3
Metals and machines 129.4 -8.5 -43.3
Non metallic products 72.1 -2.6 -6.8
Agriculture
Maize 178.7 -1.1 -1.1
Wheat 51.1 -0.6 -0.6




Sugarcane 521.0 -14.6 -14.6
Coffee
Tea 104.5 -0.4 -0.4
Roots & tubers
Pulses & oil seeds 29.9 0.3 0.3
Fruits
Vegetables 102.5 -1.4 -1.4
Cut flowers









Mining 1.5 -3.1 -3.1
Meat & dairy 153.6 -4.3 -4.3
Other manufactured food 72.7 -4.1 -4.1
Printing and publishing -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Textile & clothing 69.5 -0.9 -0.9
Leather & footwear 67.6 0.0 0.0
Wood & paper 32.1 -7.2 -7.2










Source: Authors' estimates.  58 
 
Table 14: Impacts on Exports from Combined EU-Africa FTA
No initial rent capture case  (% change from benchmark)
European 
Union Africa





Banking and other financial services 0.4 0.4 0.4
Professional business services
Road services 2.6 2.6 2.6
Railway transport 11.8
Maritime transport 1.7 1.7 1.7
Pipeline transport 3.8 3.8
Airline transport 3.6 3.6 3.6
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 1.9 1.9 1.9
Grain milling
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 3.6 3.6 3.6
Petroleum 4.6 4.6 4.6
Chemicals 1.2 1.2 1.2
Metals and machines 26.0 26.0 26.0
Non metallic products 2.6 2.6 2.6
Agriculture




Cotton 0.5 0.5 0.5
Other cereals -2.1 -2.1 -2.1
Sugarcane 2.8 2.8 2.8
Coffee 16.6 16.6 16.6
Tea -1.7 -1.7 -1.7
Roots & tubers
Pulses & oil seeds -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Fruits -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Vegetables 1.0 1.0 1.0
Cut flowers 11.4 11.4 11.4









Mining 9.4 9.4 9.4
Meat & dairy 3.5 3.5 3.5
Other manufactured food 11.9 11.9 11.9
Printing and publishing
Textile & clothing 0.2 0.2 0.2
Leather & footwear 0.6 0.6 0.6
Wood & paper -0.5 -0.5 -0.5










Source: Authors' estimates.  59 
 
 
   
Table 15: Impacts on Number of Firms from Combined EU-Africa FTA




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Communication -1.4 7.0 -5.4
Insurance -0.3 42.2 -0.6
Banking and other financial services 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.2
Professional business services 0.2 46.4 12.8 0.6
Road services -0.5 41.1 41.0 -4.2
Railway transport 3.6
Maritime transport -7.0 120.3 20.3 -35.0
Pipeline transport 2.0 1.4 5.6
Airline transport 1.8 7.1 2.1 2.2
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 0.6 56.5 -1.2 -2.0
Grain milling 0.4 59.5 -1.3 -2.8
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 0.4 53.9 -2.9 -5.6
Petroleum 3.2 27.2 -0.6 -1.4
Chemicals -0.4 33.3 -3.4 -11.1
Metals and machines -3.2 96.9 -6.7 -33.9
Non metallic products -0.7 53.8 -2.1 -5.5
Source: Authors' estimates.  60 
 
Table 16: Impacts on Imports from African FTA
No initial rent capture case  (% change from benchmark)
European 
Union Africa





Banking and other financial services 0.1 0.1 0.2
Professional business services
Road services -3.0 -2.3 -3.1
Railway transport -0.6
Maritime transport -2.5 -1.7 -2.5
Pipeline transport -0.3 -0.3
Airline transport -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 0.0 0.0 0.1
Grain milling 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 0.0 0.0 0.1
Petroleum 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chemicals 0.1 0.0 0.1
Metals and machines 0.0 0.0 0.1
Non metallic products 0.1 0.1 0.2
Agriculture
Maize 0.2 0.2 0.2
Wheat 0.1 0.1 0.1




Sugarcane -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Coffee
Tea -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Roots & tubers
Pulses & oil seeds 0.2 0.2 0.2
Fruits
Vegetables 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cut flowers









Mining -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Meat & dairy 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other manufactured food 0.0 0.0 0.0
Printing and publishing 0.1 0.1 0.1
Textile & clothing 0.3 0.3 0.3
Leather & footwear 0.2 0.2 0.2
Wood & paper 0.9 0.9 0.9










Source: Authors' estimates.  61 
 
Table 17: Impacts on Exports from African FTA
No initial rent capture case  (% change from benchmark)
European 
Union Africa





Banking and other financial services 0.1 0.1 0.1
Professional business services
Road services -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Railway transport 3.6
Maritime transport 1.3 1.3 1.3
Pipeline transport 1.2 1.2
Airline transport 1.2 1.2 1.2
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 0.2 0.2 0.2
Grain milling
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 0.1 0.1 0.1
Petroleum 0.3 0.3 0.3
Chemicals 0.0 0.0 0.0
Metals and machines 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non metallic products 0.0 0.0 0.0
Agriculture




Cotton 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other cereals -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Sugarcane 4.1 4.1 4.1
Coffee 0.5 0.5 0.5
Tea -1.2 -1.2 -1.2
Roots & tubers
Pulses & oil seeds -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Fruits 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vegetables 0.2 0.2 0.2
Cut flowers 4.9 4.9 4.9









Mining 0.8 0.8 0.8
Meat & dairy 0.2 0.2 0.2
Other manufactured food 0.8 0.8 0.8
Printing and publishing
Textile & clothing -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Leather & footwear -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Wood & paper 0.1 0.1 0.1














   
Table 18: Impacts on Number of Firms from African FTA




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Communication 0.0 0.1 0.2
Insurance 0.1 0.1 0.2
Banking and other financial services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Professional business services 0.0 -0.1 12.6 -0.1
Road services -2.2 -2.8 40.2 -5.5
Railway transport 1.1
Maritime transport -0.1 -2.8 28.3 -3.4
Pipeline transport 0.6 0.4 1.6
Airline transport 0.7 0.9 1.9 1.0
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Grain milling 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Petroleum 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chemicals 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Metals and machines 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non metallic products 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Source: Authors' estimates.  63 
 
Table 19: Impacts on Imports from EU FTA 
No initial rent capture case  (% change from benchmark)
European 
Union Africa





Banking and other financial services 0.5 0.5 0.6
Professional business services
Road services -0.6 -1.3 -1.3
Railway transport -1.2
Maritime transport -9.6 -17.2 -18.8
Pipeline transport -0.6 -0.4
Airline transport -1.0 -1.4 -1.4
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 75.2 -1.6 -2.6
Grain milling 79.3 -1.7 -3.5
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 72.4 -3.7 -7.1
Petroleum 36.0 -0.8 -1.8
Chemicals 43.5 -4.4 -14.4
Metals and machines 129.3 -8.5 -43.3
Non metallic products 71.9 -2.7 -7.0
Agriculture
Maize 178.2 -1.3 -1.3
Wheat 51.0 -0.7 -0.7




Sugarcane 527.5 -13.7 -13.7
Coffee
Tea 105.4 0.0 0.0
Roots & tubers
Pulses & oil seeds 29.6 0.1 0.1
Fruits
Vegetables 102.5 -1.4 -1.4
Cut flowers









Mining 1.7 -2.9 -2.9
Meat & dairy 153.5 -4.4 -4.4
Other manufactured food 72.6 -4.1 -4.1
Printing and publishing -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
Textile & clothing 68.9 -1.3 -1.3
Leather & footwear 67.3 -0.2 -0.2
Wood & paper 30.9 -8.1 -8.1










Source: Authors' estimates.  64 
 
Table 20: Impacts on Exports from EU FTA
No initial rent capture case  (% change from benchmark)
European 
Union Africa





Banking and other financial services 0.3 0.3 0.3
Professional business services
Road services 3.6 3.6 3.6
Railway transport 7.9
Maritime transport 0.4 0.4 0.4
Pipeline transport 2.6 2.6
Airline transport 2.5 2.5 2.5
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 1.7 1.7 1.7
Grain milling
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 3.5 3.5 3.5
Petroleum 4.4 4.4 4.4
Chemicals 1.2 1.2 1.2
Metals and machines 25.9 25.9 25.9
Non metallic products 2.6 2.6 2.6
Agriculture




Cotton 0.4 0.4 0.4
Other cereals -1.6 -1.6 -1.6
Sugarcane -1.3 -1.3 -1.3
Coffee 16.2 16.2 16.2
Tea -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Roots & tubers
Pulses & oil seeds 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fruits -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Vegetables 0.8 0.8 0.8
Cut flowers 6.2 6.2 6.2









Mining 8.5 8.5 8.5
Meat & dairy 3.4 3.4 3.4
Other manufactured food 10.9 10.9 10.9
Printing and publishing
Textile & clothing 0.5 0.5 0.5
Leather & footwear 0.7 0.7 0.7
Wood & paper -0.6 -0.6 -0.6















   
Table 21: Impacts on Number of Firms from EU FTA




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Communication -1.4 6.9 -5.6
Insurance -0.4 42.0 -0.8
Banking and other financial services 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9
Professional business services 0.2 46.5 0.2 0.7
Road services 1.7 44.3 0.7 1.4
Railway transport 2.5
Maritime transport -7.0 127.4 -12.2 -33.1
Pipeline transport 1.4 1.0 3.8
Airline transport 1.2 6.2 0.3 1.1
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages & tobacco 0.4 56.5 -1.3 -2.1
Grain milling 0.4 59.5 -1.4 -2.8
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 0.3 53.9 -3.0 -5.7
Petroleum 3.0 27.1 -0.6 -1.4
Chemicals -0.4 33.2 -3.5 -11.2
Metals and machines -3.2 96.8 -6.7 -33.9
Non metallic products -0.7 53.7 -2.2 -5.6




   
Table 22: Sensitivity Analysis of Kenya-EU FTA
Parameter Lower Central  Upper Lower Central  Upper
˃(qi, qj) –  services sectors 1.5 3 4.5 9.99 0.67 0.50
˃(qi, qj) – goods sectors see below 1.06 0.67 0.59
˃(va, bs) 0.625 1.25 1.875 0.55 0.67 0.82
˃(D, M) 2 4 6 0.65 0.67 0.69
˃(L, K) 0.5 1 1.5 0.64 0.67 0.70
˃(A1,…An) 0 0 0.25 0.67 0.67 0.67
˃(D, E) 2 4 6 0.65 0.67 0.69
ʵKEN 0.61 0.67 0.72
ʵEU 0.25 0.67 0.96
ʵAFR 0.68 0.67 0.67
ʵROW 0.90 0.67 0.55
share of rents captured 0 0 1 0.67 0.67 0.49
CRTS--share of rents captured NA 0 1 NA 0.09 -0.06
θm 0.025 0.05 0.075 0.67 0.67 0.67
˃(qi, qj) – goods sectors
sugar and bakery 2.12 2.93 3.74
beverages and tabacco 1.52 2.33 3.14
chemicals 2.01 2.82 3.63
metals and machines 8.345 16.69 25.035
gain milling 2.43 3.24 4.05
nonmetallic products 2.805 5.61 8.415
petroleum 2.75 3.56 4.37
Source: Authors' estimates
Lower values are 0.5 central values and 
upper values are 1.5 times central values
Parameter Value % Welfare Change (EV)
Central values of all 4 sets of eta














   
Table 23: Sensitivity Analysis of Kenya-Africa FTA
Parameter Lower Central  Upper Lower Central  Upper
˃(qi, qj) –  services sectors 1.5 3 4.5 5.02 0.29 0.16
˃(qi, qj) – goods sectors see below 0.32 0.29 0.28
˃(va, bs) 0.625 1.25 1.875 0.25 0.29 0.33
˃(D, M) 2 4 6 0.28 0.29 0.29
˃(L, K) 0.5 1 1.5 0.28 0.29 0.29
˃(A1,…An) 0 0 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.29
˃(D, E) 2 4 6 0.28 0.29 0.29
ʵKEN 0.31 0.29 0.27
ʵEU 0.29 0.29 0.29
ʵAFR 0.14 0.29 0.43
ʵROW 0.29 0.29 0.29
share of rents captured 0 0 1 0.29 0.29 0.05
CRTS--share of rents captured NA 0 1 NA 0.14 -0.06
θm 0.025 0.05 0.075 0.29 0.29 0.29
˃(qi, qj) – goods sectors
sugar and bakery 2.12 2.93 3.74
beverages and tabacco 1.52 2.33 3.14
chemicals 2.01 2.82 3.63
metals and machines 8.345 16.69 25.035
gain milling 2.43 3.24 4.05
nonmetallic products 2.805 5.61 8.415
petroleum 2.75 3.56 4.37
Source: Authors' estimates
Central values of all 4 sets of eta
parameters are listed in table 6B
Lower values are 0.5 central values and 
upper values are 1.5 times central values
Parameter Value % Welfare Change (EV)  68 
 
   
Table 24: Summary of Results for Professional Services --No Initial Rent Capture Case



















Rest of World 
Discriminatory 
Services
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on African services firms Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms Yes No Yes No No No Yes
50% reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms Yes Yes No No No No No
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.71 0.54 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.07
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.60 0.45 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.06
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
Tariff revenue -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Aggregate exports  0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Factor Earnings
Skilled labor 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2
Semi-skilled labor 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Unskilled labor 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Capital 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Land 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Factor adjustments
Skilled labor 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Semi-skilled labor 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Unskilled labor 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capital 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Land 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2
Source: Authors' estimates.  69 
 
 
   
Table 25: Summary of Results for Professional Services, initial rent capture case 



















Rest of World 
Discriminatory 
Services
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on African services firms Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms Yes No Yes No No No Yes
50% reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms Yes Yes No No No No No
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.63 0.52 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.05
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.53 0.44 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.04
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
Tariff revenue -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Aggregate exports  0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Factor Earnings
Skilled labor 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2
Semi-skilled labor 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Unskilled labor 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Capital 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Land 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2
Factor adjustments
Skilled labor 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Semi-skilled labor 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Unskilled labor 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capital 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Land 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1






















Table 26: Impacts on Number of Firms from Liberalisation of Barriers in Professional Services


















Rest of World 
Discriminatory 
Services
Kenya 0.5 1.7 -1.1 -0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6
European Union 49.2 5.1 40.2 43.3 -0.4 42.7 -1.6
Africa 13.4 1.7 11.4 -0.5 12.5 12.0 -0.6
Rest of the World 59.2 6.0 48.2 -1.6 -0.4 -2.0 51.4
Source: Authors' estimates.  71 
 
Figure 1 Sensitivity Analysis of Kenyan Preferential Liberalization of Services with African Partners: Impact of Partner and Excluded 





















   
Case II: Initial rent capture by Kenya  Case I: No initial rent capture by Kenya   72 
 
Figure 2: Sensitivity Analysis of Kenyan Preferential Liberalization of Services with the EU: Impact of Partner and Excluded Country 





    Case II: Initial rent capture by Kenya   Case I: No initial rent capture by Kenya   73 
Figure 3: Sample Frequency Distribution of the Welfare Results of Kenyan  
   Preferential Reduction of Services Barriers Against African Partners—30,000 simulations.   
 
 
     







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Means, 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Frequency Distributions of the Output Changes by Sector        
from Kenyan Preferential Reduction of Services Barriers Against African Partners—30, 000 simulations. 










































Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. The vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles.   75 
Figure 5: Means, 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Distributions of the Labor Payment Changes by Sector from Kenyan Preferential 
Reduction of Services Barriers Against African Partners—30,000 simulations.   











































Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. The vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Labor Income (% change)  76 
Figure 6: Sample Frequency Distribution of the Welfare Results of Kenyan Preferential Reduction of Services Barriers Against EU Partners—30,000 
simulations. 
 

































Percentage of consumption  77 
Figure 7: Means, 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Distributions of the Output Changes by Sector from Kenyan Preferential Reduction 
of Services Barriers Against EU Partners—30,000 simulations. 
   



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Aggregate Output Impact  78 
Figure 8: Means, 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Distributions of the Labor Payment Changes by Sector from Kenyan Preferential 
Reduction of Services Barriers Against EU Partners—30,000 simulations. 
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Appendix A: Trade Share Data and Tariff Rates for Kenya’s Trade Partners 
 
Trade Share Data 
 
To obtain the shares of imports and exports from the different regions of our model, we used trade data 
for 2007 obtained from WITS access to the COMTRADE database.  
 
The regions of our model are Kenya, the European Union, the East African Customs Union plus 
COMESA and the Rest of the World. For the European Union, we took the 27 member countries as of 
2007. In this appendix, we calculate and report data for the East African Customs Union and COMESA 
separately. For the East African Customs Union, we took Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. For 
COMESA, in order to avoid double counting, we took the COMESA countries less those in the East 
African Customs Union, i.e., Comoros, Congo, Djibuti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Trade shares for the ―Africa‖ 
region in our model is the sum of East Africa Customs Union plus COMESA as defined above. Rest of 
the World is the residual.  
 
We mapped two digit sectors from the COMTRADE database into the sectors of our model. The exact 
mapping is defined in the first table below.  
 
We used Kenya as the reporter country for both exports and imports. Results for both exports and imports 
are reported in the subsequent three tables, by CRTS and IRTS goods in our model separately. 
 
 
Tariff Rate Calculations 
 
Tariff and Sales Tax Data.  We started with MFN tariff rates at the eight digit level  taken from 
the website of the Kenyan government: www.kra.go.ke/customs/customsdownloads.php. These tariff 
rates were then aggregated to the sectors of our model, using simple averages. 
We obtained data on the total taxes on imports and the total value of imports and took the ratio to 
obtain the average value of import taxes in the Kenyan economy. In 2005, this was 8.4 percent.
 30 That is, 
on average, Kenyan importers paid 8.4 percent of the value of imports on import taxes that did not apply 
to domestic production. 
As we reported in Balestreri, Rutherford and Tarr (2009), the MFN tariff rates, multiplied times 
the trade flows, exceed the collected tariff rates. That is, using MFN tariff rates for all trade, the weighted 
average tariff rate exceeds the collected tariff rate of 8.4 percent for the economy as a whole. Thus, they 
exaggerate the protection received by Kenyan industry and agriculture. This is due to tariff preferences to 
regional partners and due to other preference items or tariff exemptions. We assume that zero tariffs apply 
                                                            
30 Economic Survey (2006, pp. 103, 115).    82 
on all imports from the East African Customs Union and from COMESA.
 31  Thus, we apply the MFN 
tariff rates only on the trade flows from outside of these African regions (EU and Rest of World in our 
model) and take a weighted average tariff rate of the MFN rates on the non-East African regions.  The 
resulting weighted average tariff rate on non-East African imports still exceeds 8.4 percent. We then equi-
proportionally reduced all the MFN tariffs in our model so that the estimated collected tariffs on imports 
from the EU and Rest of World divided by the total value of import is 8.4 percent. 
 
 
                                                            
31 Kenya agreed to implement zero tariffs on East African Customs Union imports as of January 1, 2005.  
See Michael-Stahl (2005).    83 
 
Notes on Product/Sector Classifications in SITC Revision 2
Product                     SITC Classiifcation (Rev. 2)
All goods 0 to 9
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages and tobacco 1     
Food manufactures (excl. bev & tob) ** 012+014++0224+023+024++0252+037+046 to 048+056+058+0612+
0615+0619+062+0712+0722+0723+073+0812 to 0918+09+41+42+43
Printing and publishing 64    
Mineral fuels 3     
Chemicals  5     
Metals and machines 67+68+69+7
Non-metallic products 66    
Other manufactures (excl. CRTS sectors) 62+81+82+83+87+88+89
Agriculture (excl. food manuf & bev, tob) 0+1+2+4-27-28-1-above food manufacturing products
Other goods All goods-Dixit/Stiglitz goods-above agriculture
Agricultural Products
Maize  044   
Wheat  041   
Rice 042   
Barley 043   
Other cereals 045   
Cotton 263   
Sugar  061   
Coffee 071   
Tea  074   
Roots and tubers 0548  
Oil seeds and pulses 22    
Fruits 057+058
Vegetables 054+056
Cut flowers  2927  
Other crops 072+075+081
Beef 0111  
Dairy products 02    
Poultry 0114  
Meats of sheep and goats 0112  
Other livestock 00+0113+0115+0116+0118
Other CRTS Goods
Fishing 03    
Forestry 24+25
Mining 27+28
Meats and dairy 01+02
Grain milling 046+047
Sugar & bakery confectionary 062+073+048
Textiles and clothing  65+84
Leather and footwear 61+85
Wood and papers 63+64
Note: ** based on all processed and manufacturing food products  84 
 
Kenyan Exports Values and Shares of Agricultural and Other CRTS Products in 2007
         Export value ($ '000) export shares
Product   COMESA15   EAC5   EU27  ROW  WLD   COMESA15   EAC5   EU27  ROW  WLD 
AGRICULTURE
Maize  671 2,694 7 9,096 12,468 0.054 0.216 0.001 0.730 1.000
Wheat  2 43 0 119 164 0.013 0.264 0.000 0.723 1.000
Rice 203 318 5 86 613 0.332 0.519 0.009 0.140 1.000
Barley 0 654 0 0 654 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Other cereals 453 107 8 309 877 0.517 0.122 0.009 0.352 1.000
Cotton 4 0 18 126 148 0.025 0.000 0.120 0.855 1.000
Sugar  10,573 8,616 19 336 19,545 0.541 0.441 0.001 0.017 1.000
Coffee 1,093 780 98,647 65,708 166,228 0.007 0.005 0.593 0.395 1.000
Tea  170,298 238 131,530 396,147 698,213 0.244 0.000 0.188 0.567 1.000
Roots and tubers 1 24 7 0 32 0.022 0.739 0.229 0.010 1.000
Oil seeds and pulses 14 157 4,831 3,007 8,009 0.002 0.020 0.603 0.375 1.000
Fruits 2,335 4,878 85,188 20,397 112,797 0.021 0.043 0.755 0.181 1.000
Vegetables 987 4,610 256,893 26,590 289,080 0.003 0.016 0.889 0.092 1.000
Cut flowers  22,982 8 316,343 50,929 390,262 0.059 0.000 0.811 0.130 1.000
Other crops 737 3,739 1,233 2,733 8,442 0.087 0.443 0.146 0.324 1.000
Beef 287 528 0 484 1,299 0.221 0.406 0.000 0.372 1.000
Dairy products 3,002 10,337 25 3,340 16,704 0.180 0.619 0.001 0.200 1.000
Poultry 101 8 0 9 118 0.856 0.067 0.000 0.077 1.000
Meats of sheep and goats 101 283 0 86 469 0.214 0.603 0.000 0.183 1.000
Other livestock 150 1,876 69 1,013 3,108 0.048 0.604 0.022 0.326 1.000
OTHER CRTS GOODS
Fishing 411 162 34,837 25,757 61,167 0.007 0.003 0.570 0.421 1.000
Forestry 412 483 4 169 1,068 0.386 0.452 0.004 0.159 1.000
Mining 2,305 29,358 21,162 21,545 74,369 0.031 0.395 0.285 0.290 1.000
Meats and dairy3,821 14,847 131 6,576 25,375 0.151 0.585 0.005 0.259 1.000
Grain milling 415 538 49 59 1,062 0.391 0.507 0.046 0.056 1.000
Sugar & bakery confectionary 14,420 33,297 1,912 16,008 65,637 0.220 0.507 0.029 0.244 1.000
Textiles and clothing  22,415 32,212 3,996 238,463 297,087 0.075 0.108 0.013 0.803 1.000
Leather and footwear 14,512 28,989 15,930 31,441 90,872 0.160 0.319 0.175 0.346 1.000
Wood and papers 16,394 47,045 2,587 7,287 73,314 0.224 0.642 0.035 0.099 1.000
Source: Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.  85 
 
Kenyan Imports of Agricultural and Other CRTS Products in 2007
         Import value ($ '000) Import shares
Product   COMESA15   EAC5   EU27  ROW  WLD   COMESA15   EAC5   EU27  ROW  WLD 
AGRICULTURE
Maize  625 14,194 0 1,445 16,265 0.038 0.873 0.000 0.089 1.000
Wheat  62 2 3,618 140,505 144,187 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.974 1.000
Rice 8,919 2,563 12 58,559 70,054 0.127 0.037 0.000 0.836 1.000
Barley 0 0 1 0 1 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Other cereals 0 9,083 3 53 9,139 0.000 0.994 0.000 0.006 1.000
Cotton 214 4,322 0 119 4,655 0.046 0.929 0.000 0.026 1.000
Sugar  72,342 1,914 4,939 35,055 114,249 0.633 0.017 0.043 0.307 1.000
Coffee 41 635 78 1,347 2,101 0.020 0.302 0.037 0.641 1.000
Tea  0 86 22 8,088 8,196 0.000 0.011 0.003 0.987 1.000
Roots and tubers 0 29 662 205 896 0.000 0.032 0.739 0.228 1.000
Oil seeds and pulses 803 16,126 164 5,296 22,388 0.036 0.720 0.007 0.237 1.000
Fruits 1,492 2,848 2,444 7,358 14,141 0.105 0.201 0.173 0.520 1.000
Vegetables 1,589 19,450 5,546 22,592 49,177 0.032 0.396 0.113 0.459 1.000
Cut flowers  0 1,844 7 161 2,012 0.000 0.917 0.003 0.080 1.000
Other crops 55 9,461 2,337 4,599 16,452 0.003 0.575 0.142 0.280 1.000
Beef 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Dairy products 693 458 779 3,437 5,367 0.129 0.085 0.145 0.640 1.000
Poultry 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Meats of sheep and goats 0 0 0 8 8 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Other livestock 67 36 246 1,787 2,136 0.031 0.017 0.115 0.836 1.000
OTHER CRTS GOODS
Fishing 3,155 640 194 4,326 8,315 0.379 0.077 0.023 0.520 1.000
Forestry 1,084 16,979 4,388 9,851 32,301 0.034 0.526 0.136 0.305 1.000
Mining 518 1,272 1,774 33,094 36,658 0.014 0.035 0.048 0.903 1.000
Meats and dairy 781 458 868 5,143 7,249 0.108 0.063 0.120 0.709 1.000
Grain milling 10,092 1,341 4,728 19,656 35,817 0.282 0.037 0.132 0.549 1.000
Sugar & bakery confectionary 3,151 1,400 6,280 20,475 31,307 0.101 0.045 0.201 0.654 1.000
Textiles and clothing  4,815 18,592 10,903 279,109 313,418 0.015 0.059 0.035 0.891 1.000
Leather and footwear 170 117 551 20,191 21,029 0.008 0.006 0.026 0.960 1.000
Wood and papers 30,504 7,720 79,746 115,781 233,751 0.130 0.033 0.341 0.495 1.000
Source: Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.  86 
 
   
Kenyan Exports and Imports of Dixit-Stiglitz Goods and Other Products in 2007
         Trade value ($ '000) Trade Share
Product    COMESA15   EAC5   EU27  ROW  WLD   COMESA15   EAC5   EU27  ROW  WLD 
EXPORTS EXPORTS
All goods 664,849 952,788 1,084,812 1,378,351 4,080,800 0.163 0.233 0.266 0.338 1.000
Beverages and tobacco 46,796 47,692 11,535 61,085 167,109 0.280 0.285 0.069 0.366 1.000
Food manuf (excl. bev & tob) 79,712 98,905 106,990 31,678 317,284 0.251 0.312 0.337 0.100 1.000
Printing and publishing 9,987 41,596 129 3,635 55,347 0.180 0.752 0.002 0.066 1.000
Mineral fuels 15,225 86,515 139 72,263 174,143 0.087 0.497 0.001 0.415 1.000
Chemicals  68,878 175,389 1,057 106,367 351,691 0.196 0.499 0.003 0.302 1.000
Metals and machines 129,528 198,787 11,782 80,253 420,350 0.308 0.473 0.028 0.191 1.000
Non-metallic products 10,513 87,666 5,697 10,639 114,515 0.092 0.766 0.050 0.093 1.000
Other manufactures 45,774 88,777 26,412 32,468 193,431 0.237 0.459 0.137 0.168 1.000
Agriculture (excl. food manuf & bev, tob) 211,253 29,739 877,333 627,966 1,746,291 0.121 0.017 0.502 0.360 1.000
Other goods 47,183 97,723 43,737 351,997 540,640 0.087 0.181 0.081 0.651 1.000
IMPORTS   IMPORTS
All goods 332,205 191,598 1,812,340 6,653,119 8,989,262 0.037 0.021 0.202 0.740 1.000
Beverages and tobacco 11,958 27,881 15,716 13,650 69,204 0.173 0.403 0.227 0.197 1.000
Food manuf (excl. bev & tob) 73,603 19,352 38,219 436,903 568,077 0.130 0.034 0.067 0.769 1.000
Printing and publishing 30,462 7,634 69,199 88,868 196,163 0.155 0.039 0.353 0.453 1.000
Mineral fuels 45,727 427 60,393 1,811,868 1,918,415 0.024 0.000 0.031 0.944 1.000
Chemicals  58,989 4,172 322,652 754,982 1,140,796 0.052 0.004 0.283 0.662 1.000
Metals and machines 60,085 12,273 958,236 2,461,164 3,491,757 0.017 0.004 0.274 0.705 1.000
Non-metallic products 5,118 491 30,219 90,373 126,201 0.041 0.004 0.239 0.716 1.000
Other manufactures 7,117 2,616 152,026 257,025 418,784 0.017 0.006 0.363 0.614 1.000
Agriculture (excl. food manuf & bev, tob) 33,340 96,683 64,962 328,230 523,215 0.064 0.185 0.124 0.627 1.000
Other goods 5,804 20,070 100,720 410,055 536,649 0.011 0.037 0.188 0.764 1.000
Source: Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.  87 
Appendix B: Documentation of the Calculation of Ownership Shares for Kenya 
 
I. Telecommunications Shares in Kenya 
 
The primary source of data was various publications of Paul Buddle Communications, including 
―Kenya—Telecoms Market Statistics and Forecasts,‖ March 20, 2008. Table 10 contains mobile 
phone subscription statistics by company and Table 2 lists the number of fixed-line phone 
subscribers. We defined market share as the share of total subscribers, summing fixed-line and 
mobile subscribers.  
 
The telecommunications companies are: Telkom Kenya, Safaricom and Celtel. Ownership shares 
are as follows. France Telecom purchased 51% of Telkom Kenya in 2007 with the Government 
of Tanzania holding the remaining 49 percent.
32. Vodafone held 35% of Safaricom network, with 
the remainder held by Telkom Kenya (60%) and a local company Mobitelea (5%).‖
33. ―Celtel 




The results for market share by country (in percent) are as follows: Kenya, 26; EU, 49; EAC, 0; 
COMESA, 0; Rest of World, 25.  
 
II. Bank Shares in Kenya. 
Bank Market Shares 
The data source for bank market shares was Bankscope, an on-line data source for about 29,000 banks 
world-wide.
35 Through Bankscope, we obtained data on total assets by bank in Kenya, owners -shareholders of the 
bank and the percent of the bank owned by each owner-shareholder. Market share of each bank was defined based 
on the bank’s assets as a share of total bank assets in the country.  We divided the regions into the European Union, 
East African Customs Union, COMESA and Rest of the World.
36   
Ownership Shares of Banks 
 
 Each bank’s market share was then allocated among geographic regions according to the shares of 
ownership of the bank. We then summed across the banks to obtain total market shares by region.  In many cases, 
however, the Bankscope data were inadequate to allocate ownership shares by region. In these cases, we 
investigated bank websites, to obtain the required ownership information. The results of our supplementary inquiries 
are listed below.   
The results we get are that owners of the banking sector of Kenya are as follows, in percent: Kenya, 61.8.; 
EU, 28.7; EAC, 0; COMESA, 0.2; ROW, 9.3.   Detailed results on the ownership of the banks are in the tables 
below. 
 
                                                            
32  http://www.orange.com/en_EN/press/press_releases/cp080917uk.html Accessed 17 April 2009 
33 See Paul Buddle Communications, ―The Kenya Regulatory and Fixed-Line Telecoms Overview,‖ March 20, 
2008. 
34 See Paul Buddle Communications, ―The Kenya Mobile Market Overview,‖ March 20, 2008. 
 
35 It combines data from the main information provider, Fitch Ratings, and nine other sources, with software for 
searching and analysis. Each bank report contains balance sheet and income statements with up to 200 data items.  
36 Although we calculated data for the U.S. and the U.K. separately, these were aggregated into the Rest of the 
World and the European Union, respectively.    88 
Table 1: Kenya Banking Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (1 of 6) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
ABN AMRO Bank NV Abn Amro Holding Nv (NL)
African Banking Corporation Limited Queens Holdings Ltd (KE) 25.00 77,200 0.56% 0.56%
African Mercantile Banking Company Limited - AMBANK
Bank of Africa Kenya Limited 93,493 0.68%
African Financial Holding Sa-African Financial Holding/Bank Of Africa (LU) 19.89 0.16%
Bank Of Africa - Madagascar (MG) 20.00 0.16%
Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij Voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. (NL) 20.00 0.16%
Bank Of Africa - Côte D'Ivoire (CI) 15.00 0.12%
Bank Of Africa - Benin (BJ) 10.11 0.08%
Bank of Baroda (Kenya) Ltd Bank Of Baroda (IN) 86.70 169,651 1.23% 1.23%
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd 1,700,672 12.30%
Barclays Bank Plc (GB) 68.50 8.43%
Kenyan Public & Institutions (KE) 31.50 3.88%
Biashara Bank of Kenya Limited
Calyon Calyon (FR)
Central Bank of Kenya Government Of Kenya (KE) 100.00 3,067,136 22.19% 22.19%
CFC Stanbic Holdings Limited Stanbic Africa Holdings Limited (GB) 60.00 581,708 4.21% 4.21%
Charterhouse Bank Limited
Chase Bank (Kenya) Limited Chase Bank (Kenya) Limited (US) 100.00 59,405 0.43% 0.43%
Citibank NA Citibank Na (US) 100.00 544,612 3.94% 3.94%
City Finance Bank Limited
Commerce Bank Limited
Commercial Bank of Africa Commercial Bank of Africa (KE) 100.00 539,477 3.90% 3.90%
Consolidated Bank of Kenya Limited Consolidated Bank of Kenya (KE) 100.00 49,528 0.36% 0.36%
Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd 831,354 6.01%
Co-Operatives Societies (??) 83.82
Individual Members Of Co-Operatives (??) 16.18
Credit Bank Limited 37,606 0.27%
Daima Bank Limited
Development Bank of Kenya Ltd Development Bank of Kenya (KE) 100.00 47,115 0.34% 0.34%
Market Share by Region (%)










     89 
Table 1: Kenya Banking Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (2 of 6) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Limited 313,234 2.27%
Aga Khan Fund For Economic Development Sa (CH) 17.32 0.76%
Barclays (Kenya) Nominees Ltd (KE) 9.85 0.43%
Habib Bank Limited (PK) 9.72 0.43%
The Jubilee Insurance Company Ltd (KE)8.77 0.39%
Diamond Jubilee Investment Trust (GB) 1.87 0.08%
Craysell Investments Ltd (KE) 1.62 0.07%
Noorali Mohan Manji (KE) 1.27 0.06%
Ameerali Nazarali Esmail (KE) 0.92 0.04%
Dubai Bank Kenya Limited
EABS Bank Limited 128,389 0.93%
Private Shareholders (KE) 65.59 0.61%
LP  Holdings (KE) 16.95 0.16%
Rajmuk Holdings (KE) 9.41 0.09%
Emperor Holdings (KE) 8.05 0.07%
East African Building Society - EABS
Equatorial Commercial Bank Limited
Equity Bank Limited British-American Investments Company (Kenya) Limited (KE) 11.06 288,544 2.09% 2.09%
Euro Bank Limited
Faulu Kenya Limited Faulu Kenya Limited (CH) 70.00 29,829 0.22% 0.22%
Fidelity Commercial Bank Limited
Fina Bank Limited 141,005 1.02%
Entreprise Banking Group (BW) 20.75 0.21%
Dhabaria Ltd (KE) 19.81 0.20%
Rare Ltd (KE) 17.83 0.18%
Sirus Ltd (KE) 15.85 0.16%
Snow Point (K) Ltd (KE) 9.91 0.10%
Harupa Ltd (KE) 3.96 0.04%
Kushan Ltd (KE) 3.96 0.04%
Reena Ltd (KE) 3.96 0.04%
Market Share by Region (%)
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Table 1: Kenya Banking Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (3 of 6) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
First American Bank of Kenya
First National Finance Bank Ltd.
Giro Commercial Bank Limited
Guardian Bank Limited
Guilders International Bank Limited
Habib Bank Limited Habib Bank Limited (PK)
Housing Finance Company of Kenya Limited 142,700 1.03%
Equity Bank Limited (KE) 20.00 0.44%
National Social Security  Fund (KE) 7.87 0.17%
Government Of Kenya (KE) 7.32 0.16%
Barclays (Kenya) Nominees Ltd 9347 (KE)4.90 0.11%
Northbound Holdings Ltd (??) 4.60
Steel Son Limited (KE) 3.55 0.08%
Nomura Nominees Ltd A/C Jmm (KE) 3.15 0.07%
Ndungu Paul Wanderi (??) 2.35
Kibuwa Enterprises Ltd (??) 0.91
Kirinyaga Construction Ltd (KE) 0.52 0.01%
Imperial Bank Limited 135,537 0.98%
Abdumal Investments Ltd (??) 14.00
Simba Colt Motors Limited (KE) 14.00 0.38%
Janco Investments Limited (??) 13.50
Kenblest Ltd (??) 12.50
Momentum Holdings Limited (KE) 12.50 0.34%
Rex Motors Ltd (??) 12.50
Ea Motor Industries (Sales & Services) Ltd (??) 11.00
Reynolds & Co. Limited (IE) 10.00 0.27%
Industrial and Commercial 
Development Corporation Government Of Kenya (KE) 100.00
Industrial Development Bank Limited
Market Share by Region (%)
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Table 1: Kenya Banking Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (4 of 6) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
Investments and Mortgages Bank Limited - I&M Bank Limited 322,035 2.33%
Biashara Securities Ltd (KE) 21.55 0.53%
Minard Holdings Limited (KE) 17.54 0.43%
Tecoma Limited (KE) 15.72 0.38%
Ziyungi Limited (KE) 15.72 0.38%
Mnana Limited (KE) 14.52 0.36%
City Trust Limited (KE) 10.14 0.25%
Sachit Shah (??) 2.40
Sarit S. Shah (??) 2.40
Kenya Commercial Bank LTD 1,333,300 9.64%
Permanent Secretary To The Treasury (KE) 26.23 5.87%
National Social Security  Fund (KE) 6.80 1.52%
Stanbic Nominees Kenya Limited A/C Icdci (KE) 3.49 0.78%
Sunil Narshi Shah (??) 2.33
Kcb Staff Pension Fund (KE) 2.32 0.52%
Stanbic Nominees Kenya Limited A/C R 48701 (KE) 1.53 0.34%
Nomura Nominees Ltd A/C Jmm (KE) 1.01 0.23%
Kenya Reinsurance Corporation Limited (KE) 0.87 0.19%
Barclays (Kenya) Nominees Ltd A/C 9230 (KE) 0.82 0.18%
Barclays (Kenya) Nominees Ltd A/C 1256 (??) 0.69
Kenya Commercial Finance Company Limited
Kenya Post Office Savings Bank 100.00 215,015 1.56% 1.56%
Kenya Women Finance Trust
K-REP Bank 75,223 0.54%
African Development Bank (II) 15.14 0.41%
Netherlands Dev. Finance Co (NL) 5.00 0.14%
Middle East Bank Kenya Limited 49,015 0.35%
Fortis Bank (BE) 25.03 0.18%
Banque Belgolaise-Belgolaise Bank (BE) 25.00 0.18%
National Bank of Kenya Ltd 520,526 3.77%
National Social Security  Fund (KE) 48.00 2.58%
Government Of Kenya (KE) 22.00 1.18%
Market Share by Region (%)
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Table 1: Kenya Banking Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (5 of 6) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
NIC Bank Limited 376,210 2.72%
First Chartered Securities Ltd (??) 16.44
Icea Investment Services Ltd (??) 9.42
Livingstone Registrars Ltd. (KE) 8.13 1.11%
Rivel Kenya Ltd (KE) 7.73 1.05%
Duncan Nderitu Ndegwa (??) 4.56
Saimar Ltd (KE) 4.13 0.56%
Amwa Holdings Ltd (??) 1.97
Kenya Commercial Bank Nominees Ltd- A/C 769G (??) 1.65
Thuthuma Ltd (??) 1.27
Makimwa Consultants Ltd (??) 1.26
Oriental Commercial Bank Ltd 20,886 0.15%
Pasha Investments Ltd (KE) 13.40 0.08%
Sag Investments Ltd (KE) 13.30 0.08%
Paramount Universal Bank Limited
Prime Bank 150,617 1.09%
Prime Capital & Credit Limited
Prudential Bank Limited
Reliance Bank Limited
Southern Credit Banking Corporation 66,003 0.48%
Others (??) 28.00
Fincity Investments Ltd (??) 23.00
Sounthern Shield Holdings Ltd (??) 20.00
Sounthern Shield Securities Ltd (??) 19.00
Sadrudin Karim Kurji (??) 10.00
Stanbic Bank Kenya Limited 100.00 372,120 2.69% 2.69%
Standard Chartered Bank Kenya 1,169,151 8.46%
Standard Chartered Holdings (Africa) B.V. (NL) 73.81 8.11%
Kabarak Limited (??) 1.03
Old Mutual Life Assurance Company Limited (KE) 0.69 0.08%
National Social Security  Fund (KE) 0.68 0.07%
Barclays (Kenya) Nominees Ltd A/C 1256 (??) 0.59
Kenya Commercial Bank Nominees Ltd- A/C 744 (KE) 0.51 0.06%
Standard Chartered Africa Holdings Limited (GB) 0.48 0.05%
Barclays (Kenya) Nominees Ltd A/C 1853 (KE) 0.45 0.05%
Barclays (Kenya) Nominees Ltd A/C 9230 (KE) 0.36 0.04%
Market Share by Region (%)
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Table 1: Kenya Banking Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (6 of 6) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
The Company for Habitat & Housing in 
Africa 71,600 0.52%
Trans-National Bank Limited Five Kenyan Private Companies (KE) 88.69 42,967 0.31% 0.31%
Trust Bank Limited
Universal Bank
Victoria Commercial Bank Ltd. 61732.04 0.45%
35 Other Shareholders (??) 27.24
Kingsway Investments Ltd (KE) 16.43 0.12%
Jong-Chul Kim (KE) 10.81 0.08%
Rochester Holding Limited (KE) 10.74 0.08%
Monetary Credit Holdings Ltd (KE) 6.65 0.05%
Godfrey C. Omondi (KE) 6.05 0.04%
Orchid Holdings Ltd (KE) 5.83 0.04%
Rajan Janii & Kalapi Jani (??) 5.70
Kanji Damji Pattni (KE) 5.39 0.04%
Pattni Yogesh K (??) 5.16
KE GB EU EAC COM US ROW
Grand Total =  1 3,824,591
Market 
Share 59.00% 1 5.46% 9.1 8% 0.00% 0.16% 4.37% 3.46%
Scaled 
Share 64.39% 1 6.87% 1 0.02% 0.00% 0.17% 4.77% 3.77%
Market Share by Region (%)
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Supplementary Information on Ownership Shares of Tanzanian Banks from Bank 
Websites 
 (Quotes are from the websites listed.) 
 
National Microfinance –―Rabobank, 34.9%; The Government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania,  30.0%; Public, 21.0%; National Investment Company Limited (NICOL), 
6.6%; Exim Bank Tanzania, 5.8%; Tanzania Chambers of Commerce Industries and 
Agriculture (TCCIA), 1.7%.  
http://www.nmbtz.com/about_nmb/shareholder_information.html  . 
 
   CRDB Bank Plc – TZ 38.8% – shareholders are listed as follows: 
―Private individuals, 37.0;  Co operatives  , 14.0;  Companies, 10.2;   DANIDA 
investment fund, 30.0;   Parastatals ( NIC & PPF ), 8.8. ‖ 
http://www.crdbbank.com/aboutUs.asp Accessed 3 April 2009. 
 
  Commercial Bank of Africa –according to their website they are ―wholly Kenyan 
owned.‖  http://www.cba.co.ke/default2.php?active_page_id=117  
 
  Citibank NA – US 100% 
 
 
  Kenya Post Office Savings Bank ―The bank is wholly owned by the Government of 




  K-REP Bank  ―  International Finance Corporation, 16.7%; The African 
Development Bank, 15.1%; The Netherlands Dev. Finance Co. (FMO), 5.0%; Triodos, 
11.0%; ShoreCap International, 8.2%; Kwa (ESOP), 10.0%; K-Rep Group, 25.0%; 
Founding Members, 5.2%. ICDC-I (Public investment company)   3.8%‖ 
http://www.k-
repbank.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=71&Itemid=109  . 
 
  Chase Bank (Kenya) Limited – U.S. 100% 
 
  Development Bank of Kenya Ltd – KE 100% - ―Consequently after forty five years the 
bank ownership changed to one that is Kenyan owned and directed as follows; 
Industrial & Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), 89.3%; Transcentury Ltd, 
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The premium information came from the Insurance Industry Annual Report for 2007 of the Association of 
Kenya Insurers.
37  Table 9 of their report lists premium income by company and type of insurance. We define 
market share of a company by the company share of total market premia.   
For ownership shares, we commissioned a survey from a specialist at the Association of Kenyan Insurers.
 38 
He provided the data on the ownership shares of the Kenyan companies. In the table below, we list the result of 
these calculations.  
                                                            
37 Available at: http://www.akinsure.com/images/aki-annual-report-2007.pdf 
 
38 We thank Mr. Joseph Luvisia Jamwaka ( a fellow of the Life Management Institute of the U.S. and Associate of 
the Chartered institute of Insurance of the UK) for providing this information.    96 
Table 2: Kenya Insurance Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (1 of 7) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
African Merchant Assurance Company 563 1.71% 1.71%
Hon. William Ruto (KE) 80.00
Silas Simatwo (KE) 20.00
AIG Insurance Company AIG (US) 100.00 1,801 5.48% 5.48%
APA Insurance Company 2355 7.17% 7.17%
Apollo Insurance (KE) 60.00
Pan Africa Insurance Holdings (KE) 40.00
Blue Shield Insurance Company 2,273 6.92% 6.92%
Beth Ngonyo Mungai (KE) 40.05
Bermuda Holdings Ltd (KE) 33.10
African Theatres Ltd (KE) 13.55
James Muigai Ngengi (KE) 3.31
Jean Muigai Ngengi (KE) 3.31
Peter Kamau Ngengi (KE) 3.31
Martha Vincent & Paul Vincent  (KE) 3.31
Simon Evans Githinji (KE) 0.02
Simon Munyi Gachoki (KE) 0.01
British American Insurance Company 679 2.07%
British America (K) Ltd (??) 66.67
Jimnah Mbaru (KE) 25.00 1.55%
Peter K Munga (KE) 5.00 0.31%
Benson I Wairegi (KE) 3.33 0.21%
Cannon Assurance Company 557 1.70% 1.70%
Inder Jit Talwar (KE) 0.00
Cannon Holdings (KE) 40.00
Evisa Invesments (PVT) Ltd (KE) 28.70
PBM Nominees (KE) 31.30
Concord Insurance Company 585 1.78% 1.78%
Dorse Gems International Inc (KE) 32.00
Kirumba Mwaura (KE) 36.00
James Gacheru (KE) 32.00
Market Share by Region (%)
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Table 2: Kenya Insurance Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (2 of 7) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
Co-operative Insurance Company 1,028 3.13% 3.13%
Harambee Co-operative Movement (KE) 9.06
Aembu Farmers Co-operative Society Ltd (KE) 8.30
Kiambu Unity Finance Co-operative Union (KE) 8.15
CIC Staff Co-operative Savings and Credit (KE) 7.27
The Co-operative Bank of Kenya  (KE) 6.13
Bandari Co-operative Savings and Credit (KE) 3.34
Mwalimu Co-operative Savings and Credit (KE) 1.59
Kipsigis Teachers Savings and Credit (KE) 1.32
Nacico Savings and Credit Co-operative (KE) 1.10
Stima Savings and Credit Co-operative (KE) 1.09
Emmanuel Kipkemboi Birech (KE) 1.30
Isaac Waithaka Kamunya (KE) 1.12
Teresa Wanjiru Thimba (KE) 1.10
Leonard Obura Oloo (KE) 0.89
Gerald Mbaabu M'ikunyua (KE) 0.84
Francis Kamau Ng'ang'a (KE) 0.64
Others (KE) 46.76
Corporate Insurance Company 351 1.07% 1.07%
Xanthippe Holdings Ltd (KE) 63.30
Ejax Investments Ltd (KE) 36.70
CFC Life Assurance Company 674 2.05%
CfC Stanbic Holdings Group (GB) 60.00 1.23%
C Njonjo (KE)
U P Jani (KE)
J G Kiereini (KE)
J H D Milne (UK)
M Soundararajan (KE)
A Munda (KE)
R E Leakey (KE)
Directline Assurance Company Ltd 259 0.79% 0.79%
Royal Credit Limited (KE) 99.70
Samuel S. K. Macharia (KE) 0.10
Purity G. Macharia (KE) 0.10
Dan Korobia (KE) 0.10
Market Share by Region (%)
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Table 2: Kenya Insurance Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (3 of 7) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
Fidelity Shield Insurance Company 684 2.08% 2.08%
Southern Shield Holdings Ltd (KE) 66.70
Southern Credit Banking Corp. (KE) 24.40
Soli Limited (KE) 6.40
Kenya Shipping Agency (KE) 1.40
First Assurance Company 1,038 3.16% 3.16%
First Assurance Investment Ltd (KE) 83.00
Syndicate Nominee Ltd (KE) 17.00
Gateway Insurance Company 436 1.33% 1.33%
Godfrey W Karauri (KE) 21.20
John N Muchuki (KE) 1.40
Bethuel M Gecaga (KE) 8.30
Muvokanza Limited (KE) 1.40
Eliud Ndirangu (KE) 4.30
Jerome P N Kariuki (KE) 0.30
Raymond Matiba (KE) 0.30
Francis Thuo (KE) 1.80
Kihara Waithaka (KE) 2.10
Mubiru Housing Company (KE) 0.90
Maina Kimere & Partners (KE) 5.40
Isaac G. Wanjohi (KE) 14.50
Wilson Kiragu (KE) 1.40
Chief Ezekiel N Onwere (KE) 7.60
Isaac Njoroge (KE) 0.60
James M Gacheru (KE) 1.10
Geminia Insurance Company 460 1.40% 1.40%
Gikoi Development Co. Ltd (KE) 8.16
Mbagi Limited (KE) 34.70
Stanley M. Githunguri (KE) 26.53
Leonard M Kabetu (KE) 0.30
Bimal R. Shah (KE) 5.67
Harsha R. Shah (KE) 1.19
Hasit K Shah (KE) 1.38
Khetshi K Shah (KE) 1.38
Universal Roadways (K) Ltd (KE) 5.53
Kiriti Shah (KE) 2.67
Jay K Shah (KE) 1.38
Mona D Shah (KE) 1.38
Mona D Shah (KE) 5.68
Devchand A. Shah (KE) 2.67
Market Share by Region (%)
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Table 2: Kenya Insurance Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (4 of 7) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
General Accident Insurance 682 2.08% 2.08%
Rapun Limited (KE) 49.00
J S Insurance Limited (KE) 49.00
Shantilal Shah (KE) 2.00
Heritage All Insurance Company 1505 4.58%
CFC (GB) 64.08 2.94%
African Liason Consultant Services (KE) 35.92 1.65%
Insurance Company of East Africa First Chartered Securities Limited (KE) 100.00 1,173 3.57% 3.57%
Intra Africa Assurance Company 402 1.22%
Robert T. Gachecheh (KE) 10.50 0.18%
Archibald Githinji (KE) 7.50 0.13%
Mahendra Chandulal (KE) 5.00 0.09%
Upenra Ambalal Patel (KE) 5.00 0.09%
Jitenra Ambalal Patel  (KE) 5.00 0.09%
Dinesh Chandulal Patel (KE) 10.00 0.17%
Henry Mkangi (KE) 3.00 0.05%
Bharat Kumar Patel (KE) 5.00 0.09%
Joseph Muriu (KE) 5.00 0.09%
Premji Ratna (KE) 5.00 0.09%
Ranjaben Suresh Patel (KE) 5.00 0.09%
Eleyo Saw Mills  (??) 20.00
Praful C Patel (KE) 5.00 0.09%
Invesco Insurance Company 958 2.92%
Jubilee Insurance Company 2,450 7.46%
Jubilee Holdings Ltd (KE) 100.00 7.46%
Kenneth Hamish Wooler Shah (KE) 0.00
Neville Patrick Gibson Warren (IN) 0.00
Kenindia Assurance Company 3,028 9.22%
Life Insurance Corp. Of India (IN) 10.00 0.92%
General Insurance Corp Of India (IN) 9.00 0.83%
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (IN) 9.00 0.83%
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (IN) 9.00 0.83%
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (IN) 9.00 0.83%
National Insurance Co. Ltd. (IN) 9.00 0.83%
Pv Karia (IN) 1.39 0.13%
M N Mehta (KE) 0.00 0.00%
M P Chandaria (KE) 0.00 0.00%
Sadasiv Mishra (KE) 0.00 0.00%
Simeon Nyachae (KE) 7.00 0.64%
Chandaria Foundation Trustees (KE) 7.01 0.65%
Mehta Group Of Companies (KE) 6.02 0.55%
Lex Holdings (KE) 3.66 0.34%
Others (KE) 20.00 1.84%
Market Share by Region (%)
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Table 2: Kenya Insurance Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (5 of 7) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
Kenya Orient Insurance Company 283 0.86% 0.86%
Thanak Investments (KE) 90.39
Rajwinder Singh (KE) 5.95
Avtar Singh Ubhi (KE) 1.80
Kahn Singh Ubhi (KE) 1.80
Luka Daudi Galgalo (KE) 0.06
Kenya Alliance Insurance Company International Controls Limited (??) 100.00 353 1.07%
Lion of Kenya Insurance Company First Chartered Security (KE) 80.00 1,217 3.71% 3.71%
Kenya Holdings (KE) 20.00
Madison Insurance Company Amedo Madison Holdings Limited (KE) 100.00 625 1.90% 1.90%
Mayfair 273 0.83% 0.83%
Adrea Ltd (KE) 27.77
Corporate Investments (KE) 12.48
A 2 Enterprises (KE) 9.32
Tinker Bird Securities (KE) 9.15
Kazkazi Maritime Ltd (KE) 3.12
Union Logistics (KE) 3.12
Marenyo Ltd (KE) 8.32
Muhwai Ltd (KE) 6.55
Mahesh Doshi And Sheila Doshi (KE) 6.24
Nsp Holdings Ltd (KE) 6.24
Lakdawalla Investments Ltd (KE) 4.16
Bharasa Investments Ltd (KE) 3.54
Mercantile Life & General Insurance 369 1.12% 1.12%
Ecobank Kenya Ltd (KE) 20.00
L.P Holdings (KE) 21.00
Barclays Trust (KE) 24.00
Eabs Bank (KE) 35.00
Occidental Insurance Company 740 2.25% 2.25%
Park Enterprises Ltd (KE) 30.00
Oak Investments Ltd (KE) 15.00
Landsend Kenya Ltd (KE) 15.00
Hansing Ltd (KE) 15.00
Rock Investment Ltd (KE) 15.00
Ngamacu Ltd (KE) 5.00
Maganlal Lakhamshi Dodhia (KE) 2.50
Kantilal Maganalal Dodhia (KE) 2.50
Market Share by Region (%)
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Table 2: Kenya Insurance Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (6 of 7) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
Pacis Insurance Company Ltd 162 0.49% 0.49%
Luna Registered Trustees  (KE) 35.87
Archdiocese Of Nairobi (KE) 32.56
Association Of Sisterhoods  (KE) 5.42
Diocese Of Nakuru (KE) 4.65
Religious Superior Confrence  (KE) 2.34
Diocese Of Muranga (KE) 2.20
Diocese Of Ngong  (KE) 2.09
Diocese Of Kisii (KE) 1.71
Diocese Of Isiolo  (KE) 1.63
Diocese Of Machakos (KE) 1.12
Diocese Of Nyahururu  (KE) 1.00
Diocese Of Embu (KE) 0.90
Diocese Of Garissa  (KE) 1.00
Diocese Of Marsabit (KE) 1.00
Archiocese Of Kisumu  (KE) 1.00
Catholic University Of East Africa (KE) 1.63
Others (KE) 4.00
Pioneer Life Assurance Company 89 0.27% 0.27%
Rose Waruinge (KE) 9.00
Mtalaki Mwashimba (KE) 11.00
James Olubayi (KE) 80.00
Phoenix of East Africa Assurance 525 1.60% 1.60%
Transworld Investment Limited (KE) 77.87
Kiruma International  (KE) 8.93
Bawan Limited (KE) 3.40
Others (KE) 10.00
Real Insurance Company 746 2.27%
Mureka Investments (KE) 69.00 1.57%
Zaniki Holdings Ltd (KE) 15.00 0.34%
The Globe Insurance Company (UK) 15.00 0.34%
Kenya Farmers Association (KE) 1.00 0.02%
Standard Assurance Company 522 1.59%
Market Share by Region (%)
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Table 2: Kenya Insurance Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (7 of 7) 
KE GB EU EAC
COME
SA US ROW
Tausi Assurance Company 500 1.52% 1.52%
Rasik Kantaria (KE) 10.00
Prime Capital Limited (KE) 30.00
Brookwood Investment Limited (KE) 7.00
Mukesh Patel (KE) 7.14
Shantilal Shah (KE) 19.30
Rajnikat Sanghrajka (KE) 4.56
Nayan Nayendra Thaker (KE) 5.66
Others (KE) 17.00
The Monarch Insurance Company 140 0.43% 0.43%
Valencia Holding Limited (KE) 50.00
Tamasha Corporation Ltd  (KE) 50.00
Trident Insurance Company Trident Investment Limited (KE) 100.00 360 1.10% 1.10%
UAP Provincial Insurance Company 2,000 6.09% 6.09%
J N Muguiyi (KE) 10.43
Centum Investment Company (KE) 24.07
C J Kirubi (KE) 24.07
Bawan Limited (KE) 35.27
Others (KE) 7.00
Kenya GB EU EAC COM US ROW
Market 
Share 79.64% 3.28% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.48% 5.19%
Grand Total (million KSH) = 32,845
Scaled 
Share 85.09% 3.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.86% 5.55%
Market Share by Region (%)
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IV. Railroad Transportation 
 
In the hope of improved performance, in November 2006, Kenya’s (and 
Uganda’s) railways were turned over to Rift Valley Railways, a consortium led by South 
Africa’s Sheltam Trade Close.  This consortium won the right to operate the railways for 
25 years. They are a monopolist, so we infer 100 percent ownership to the Rest of the 
World. 
39  
V. Pipeline Transportation 
 
The Kenya Pipeline Company operates 800 kilometers of pipeline within Kenya for the transport of refined 
oil products. The pipeline runs from the refinery at the port of Mombassa to the capital of Nairobi, and with 
its western extension to Eldoret and to Kisimu. This pipeline is operated by the Kenya Pipeline Company, a 
wholly owned entity of the Government of Kenya.
40  
 
In addition, there is a 320 kilometer pipeline under construction to extend the pipeline from Eldoret to 
Kampala Uganda.  It is a Public-Private Partnership with the Governments of Uganda and Kenya originally 
each holding 24.5 percent shares. The remaining 51 percent was to be held by a consortium. Tamoil East 
Africa, a company registered in Uganda, owns 70 percent of the remainder. Tamoil East Africa is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Tamoil Holdings, the Libyan state owned oil firm. The remaining 30 percent in the 
private consortium is held by Habib Investments, an investment company belonging to Habib Kagimu, a 
Ugandan businessman. However, in 2008, the Government of Uganda agreed to take only half of its 24.5 
percent share and sell the other half to the private sector consortium. Thus, the share of the pipeline 
extention to Kampala of Tamoil East Africa increased to 44.3 percent and of Habib Investments to 19.0 
percent.
41     
 
We assume that shares of the market are proportional to the kilometers of the pipeline, and allocate 
ownership shares accordingly. There are 1120 kilometers of pipeline. The finished pipeline is 60 percent of 
the total and the Kampala extension is 40 percent. The Kenyan government holds 100 percent ownership 
interest in 800 kilometers (or 60 percent of the total) and 24.5 ownership interest in the remaining 320 
kilometers (or 9.8 of the total) for a total share of 69.8 percent. The Uganda ownership share is the sum of 
the share of the Government of Uganda and the share of Habib Investments, i.e., 12.5 percent (equals .4 * 
(12.25 + 19.0)). The results are as follows.  
Kenya, 69.8; Uganda, 12.5; Rest of World, 17.7.
                                                           
39 On May 7, 2009, the Kenyan government announced it would like to renegotiate the contract and build 
(along with the government of Uganda) a second line to haul more cargo to the inland countries like 
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. See The New Vision, May 7, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/220/680519.   
40 See Kenya Pipeline Company on Wikipedia at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya_Pipeline_Company, 
and the company website at:  http://www.kpc.co.ke/ 
41  See ―Uganda cedes stake of oil pipeline to Tamoil of Libya, local investors,― Libya On-Line, July 21, 
2008. Available at: http://www.libyaonline.com/news/details.php?cid=75&id=4830   104   105 
Appendix C : Estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz Elasticities of Substitution 
 for Kenyan  Imperfectly Competitive Goods 
 
It was necessary for us to obtain estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities of 
substitution for the imperfectly competitive sectors in our model. Christian Broda, Joshua Greenfield and David 
Weinstein (2006) estimated Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities of substitution at the 3 digit level in 73 
countries. Among the 73 countries, there were four in sub-Saharan Africa: the Central African Republic, 
Madagascar, Malawi and Mauritius. We judged that Madagascar was the country closest in characteristics to 
Kenya, so we took the values of the elasticities estimated for Madagascar as a proxy for the elasticities for 
Kenya. 
 
Broda et al., estimate 3 digit elasticities for 130 goods sectors, but there are 34 goods sectors in our 
model,  It was necessary to map the sectors estimated by Broda et al. into the sectors of our model. In table C1 
of this appendix, we show the mapping for the imperfectly competitive sectors. (These elasticiteis are not 
relevant in our model for perfectly competitive sectors.)  
 
Next, since there are often multiple sectors from Broda et al. mapped into a single sector in our model, 
it was necessary to determine a method of weighting the Broda et al. elasticities. There are reasons to use both 
export shares as well as import shares. A larger share of a subcategory in imports reflects more imports, and 
more likely there are more varieties of imports. So weighting by the import share of a subcategory is better than 
an unweighted measure.  Domestic varieties are also important.  Since we do not have production data for the 
subcategories, we use export shares as a proxy for domestic production by subcategory. Analogously, 
weighting subcategories by export shares is better than unweighted categories. Since both import shares and 
export shares are useful in the weighting, we take one half the shares of both exports and imports as the 
weights. The resulting elasticities are reported in table C1.   
 
Broda, Christian , Joshua Greenfield and David Weinstein (2006), ―From Groudnuts to Globalization: A 




   





   
Table C1: Estimated Elasticities of Substitution for Varieties in Kenyan Imperfectly Competitive Goods Sectors
Sector in our Model Matching HS-3 Code from Broda et al estimates weighted elasticity of substitution
Beverages & tobacco 220, 240 2.3
Petroleum 271 3.6
Chemicals 280-391, 390, 393 2.8
Metals and machines 720-854 16.7
Non metallic products 680-702 5.6
Grain milling 110 3.2
Sugar & bakery & confectionary 170 2.9
Source: Authors calculations based on estimates from Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006).   107 
Appendix D: Engineering Services in Kenya - Restrictiveness Index 
 
The components of the engineering restrictiveness index as well as the scoring options are presented 
in Table D1.  
 
Table D1: Professions Restrictiveness Index  
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The scoring for Kenya is described below. It is based on the results of the World Bank Regulatory 
Survey in East Africa




Barriers to establishment 
 
Form of establishment Score 0.5 
 
Foreign service providers are required to incorporate or establish the businesses locally. There are 
no restrictions on forms of incorporation.   
 
Foreign partnership/joint venture/association Score 0 
No restrictions. 
 




Investment and ownership by non-professional investors Score 0.5  
 
An engineering/ consulting firm must have at least one Partner/Director registered as Consulting 
Engineer who has in force an Annual Practicing Licence in the specified disciplines.  
 








Quotas/economic tests on the number of foreign professionals and firms Score 1 
 
Entry permits are issued to non-citizens with skills not available at present in the Kenya (class A 




Licensing and accreditation of domestic professionals Score 1 
 
Membership in association is compulsory. Professional examination, practical experience and proof 
of higher education are required. 
 
 
Licensing and accreditation of foreign professionals Score 0.75 
Foreign  professionals  must  be  registered  members  of  the  Engineers  Association.  Foreign 
professionals must  be holder of a diploma, degree or other qualification recognized by  the  Association of 
Engineers of Kenya. 
 
Movement of people - permanent Score 0.5  
 





Activities reserved by law to the profession Score 1 
                                                           
42 The regulatory surveys were conducted by local consultants who interviewed the professional associations in the examined East 
African countries in 2009.  
43 The policy surveys were conducted by DECRG in 2008-2009.    111 
 
The engineering profession has an exclusive right to perform the following services:  design and 
planning, representation for obtaining permits (signature of designs), tender and contract administration, project 
management including monitoring of execution, planning and managing maintenance, survey sites, testing and 
certification and expert witness activities. There is no law prohibiting a foreign provider with a commercial 
presence in Kenya from providing these services. The engineering profession has a shared right to provide the 
following services: feasibility studies, environmental assessment, and construction cost management. There is 
no law prohibiting a foreign provider with a commercial presence in Kenya from providing these services. 
Apart from design and planning, which can be done elsewhere and sent to Kenya, a foreign provider supplying 
services  (i.e.,  without  commercial  presence  in  Kenya)  will  need  a  work  permit  in  order  to  provide  these 
services.  
 
Multidisciplinary practices Score 0 
 
There are no restrictions on cooperation between engineering professionals and other professionals. 
The same applies to foreign suppliers. 
 
Advertising, marketing and solicitation Score 1 
 
Advertising  and  marketing  by  Kenyan  professional  engineers  as  well  as  foreign  suppliers  is 
prohibited. 
 
Fee setting Score 0.5 
 
Prices /fees in the engineering services applicable to the private sector and other institutions outside 
the government are not regulated. In the case of professional engineering services rendered to the government, 
prices/fees are determined the Ministry in charge of engineering services but as of 2010, this function will be 
performed  by  the Engineering Registration  Board (ERB). The ERB  will  set the  prices/fees to  be paid for 
professional  engineering  services  rendered  to  the  government;  the  service  providers  will  be  expected  to 
compete on the technical aspect only.  
 




Movement of people - Temporary Score 0 
 
No restrictions.  
 
Other restrictions (Addition categories) Score 0.33 
 
Restrictions on hiring professionals: Investment Promotion Act 2004 (cap  172) section 13.1. The 
employment of foreign natural persons for the implementation of foreign investment shall be agreed upon by 




Dee, P. (2005), ―A compendium of barriers to services trade‖, prepared for the World Bank, 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/staff/phillippa_dee/Combined_report.pdf 
 
Nguyen-Hong, D. (2000), ―Restrictions on Trade in Professional Services‖, Productivity Commission Staff Research 
Paper, Ausinfo, Canberra. Available at: http://www.pc.gov.au/research/staffresearch/rotips 
 
World Bank Regulatory Survey in East Africa conducted in the context of the Project ―Trade in Professional Services 
in East Africa‖ in 2009.  
 
World Bank Survey on Applied Policies in Services conducted by Development Research Group, in 2008-2009. 
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Appendix E: Data on Research and Development Expenditures and Sales for the United States 
in 2004 and 2005. 
 
 
TABLE E1.  Funds for industrial R&D and sales for companies performing industrial R&D in the United States, by industry: 2004 and 2005
Sales in $millions Ratio of R&D expenses
Industry and company size NAICS codes 2004 2005 2004-2005 average in 2005 to sales (x1,000)
All industries 21–23, 31–33, 42, 44–81 208,301     226,159 217,230 6,119,133 36
    Manufacturing industries 31–33 147,288     158,190 152,739 3,998,256 38
        Food 311 2,254     2,716 2,485 374,342 7
        Beverage and tobacco products 312 555 i 539 547 38,003 14
        Textiles, apparel, and leather 313–16 570     816 693 51,639 13
        Wood products 321 D D 0 27,002 0
        Paper, printing, and support activities 322, 323 D D 0 159,608 0
        Petroleum and coal products 324 1,603 D 802 404,317 2
        Chemicals 325 D 42,995 21,498 624,344 34
            Pharmaceuticals and medicines 3254 31,477 34,839 33,158 273,377 121
        Plastics and rubber products 326 D 1,760 880 90,176 10
        Nonmetallic mineral products 327 787 894 841 50,344 17
        Primary metals 331 727 631 679 110,960 6
        Fabricated metal products 332 1,512 1,375 1,444 174,165 8
        Machinery 333 6,579 8,531 7,555 230,941 33
        Computer and electronic products 334 48,296 D 24,148 472,330 51
        Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 335 2,664 2,424 2,544 101,398 25
        Transportation equipment 336 D D 0 957,051 See note
            Motor vehicles, trailers, and parts 3361–63 15,677 D 7,839 646,486 12
            Aerospace products and parts 3364 13,086 15,005 14,046 227,271 62
            Other transportation equipment other 336 D D 0 83,294 0
        Furniture and related products 337 408     400 404 48,534 8
        Miscellaneous manufacturing 339 4,388     5,143 4,766 83,103 57
            Medical equipment and supplies 3391 3,343     4,374 3,859 56,661 68
            Other miscellaneous manufacturing other 339 1,045     769 907 26,442 34
Industry and company size NAICS codes 2004 2005 2004-2005 average
#DIV/0!
    Nonmanufacturing industries 21–23, 42, 44–81 61,013     67,969 64,491 2,120,877 30
        Mining, extraction, and support activities 21 D D 0 33,665 0
        Utilities 22 202 210 206 223,395 1
        Construction 23 1,481 D 741 57,187 13
        Wholesale trade 42 D D 0 107,485 0
        Retail trade 44, 45 1,596 D 798 232,150 3
        Transportation and warehousing* 48, 49 D D 0 79,436 See Note
        Information 51 22,593 23,836 23,215 445,489 52
        Finance, insurance, and real estate 52, 53 1,708     3,030 2,369 580,380 4
        Professional, scientific, and technical services 54 28,709     32,021 30,365 261,500 116
            Architectural, engineering, and related services 5413 4,265     4,687 4,476 50,121 89
            Computer systems design and related services 5415 11,575     13,592 12,584 136,376 92
            Scientific R&D services 5417 11,355     12,299 11,827 34,516 343
            Other professional, scientific, and technical servicesother 54 1,514     1,444 1,479 40,487 37
        Health care services 621–23 500     989 745 25,076 30
        Other nonmanufacturing
b 55, 56, 61, 624,  1,595     2,137 1,866 75,115 25





*We evaluate transportation as a medium R&D sector since three sectrors dominate R&D expenditures of US multinationals operating abroad. These are transportation, chemiicals and computers and 
electronics. Moreover, about two-thirds of all R&D expenditures of foreign multinationals operatingi in the US was performed in the same three sectors. See "U.S. and International Research and 
Development: Funds and Technology Linkages," at  'http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/c4/c4s5.htm.
SOURCE:  Calculated from data in National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Industrial Research and Development:  2005, Data Tables . Available at:  
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf10319/content.cfm?pub_id=3750&id=3. Appendix F:
Kenya Model with Multiple FDI and Trade Partners
Edward J. Balistreri






This document presents the algebraic formulation of a general-equilibrium numeric-
simulation model of the Kenya economy. The model is currently under development by
the authors. An earlier version of this model was used to analyze unilateral services
liberalization in Kenya [Balistreri et al. (2009)]. The model now includes features that
allow for an analysis of regional trade agreements.
The model includes 55 goods and services, which are purchased by households, ¯rms,
and the government. Let the goods and services be indexed by g 2 G. Divide these goods
and services into the following three categories that de¯ne their treatment in the model
formulation: (i:) Business Services, characterized by monopolistic competition and foreign
direct investment (FDI), indexed by i 2 I ½ G; (ii:) Dixit-Stiglitz manufacturing sectors,
characterized by monopolistic competition, indexed by j 2 J ½ G; and (iii:) Constant
Returns To Scale (CRTS) goods indexed by k 2 K ½ G. In the current aggregation there
are 9 elements in I, 7 elements in J, and 39 elements in K. Goods and services are also
classi¯ed by their associated region, indexed by r 2 R, where there are 4 regions.1 The
accounts track the incomes of 10 rural and 10 urban households, indexed by h 2 H, and
1The current formulation includes Kenya or the domestic region (D), the European Union (EU),
important African trade partners (AFR), and the rest-of-world region (ROW), such that R =
fD;EU;AFR;ROWg.
1there are 5 primary factors of production indexed by f 2 F.
Table 1 sumarizes the equilibrum conditions and associated variables. The non-linear
system (of 1,364 equations and variables) is formulated in GAMS/MPSGE and solved
using the PATH algorithum. We proceed with a description and algebraic representation
of each of the conditions itemized in Table 1.
1 Dual representation of technologies and preferences
Technologies and preferences are represented in the Kenya model through value func-
tions that embed the optimizing behavior of agents. Generally, any linearly-homogeneous
transformation of inputs into outputs is fully characterized by a unit-cost (or expenditure)
function. Setting the output price equal to optimized unit cost yields the equilibrium con-
dition for the activity level of the transformation. That is, a competitive constant-returns
activity will increase up to the point that marginal bene¯t (unit revenue) equals marginal
cost. In the case of the Kenya model not all transformations are constant returns, so
there are exceptions. In general, however, we will use the convention of setting unit rev-
enues (left-hand side) equal to unit cost (right-hand side) and associating this equilibrium
condition with a transformation activity level.
Agents in Kenya wishing to purchase a particular good or service g face an aggregate
price PAg. Let tsg equal the sales tax rate such that (1 ¡tsg)PAg is the net-of-tax price of
the aggregate of domestic, foreign, and FDI (if applicable) varieties of g. In constructing
the aggregate, we will rely on the following notation for the component prices:
PDg Gross price of domestic output (8g 2 G),
PMg
r Gross price of cross-border imports from region r of Business Services and CRTS
goods (8g 2 (I [ K)),
P g
r Dixit-Stiglitz price index on region-r varieties (8g 2 (I [ J)).
2Table 1: General equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium Condition (Equation) Associated Variable Dimensions
Dual representation of preferences and technologies:
Armington unit-cost functions (1) 8i 2 I Ag : Armington Activity G
(2) 8j 2 J
(3) 8k 2 K
Dixit-Stiglitz price indexes (4) 8g 2 (I [ J) Q
g
r : D-S Activity by region (I + J) £ R
Zero Pro¯ts for Dixit-Stiglitz ¯rms (5) 8g 2 (I [ J) N
g
r : Number of Firms (I + J) £ R
Dixit-Stiglitz composite input prices (6) 8g 2 (I [ J) and r = D Z
g
r : IRTS resource use (I + J) £ R
(7) 8j 2 J and r 6= D
(8) 8i 2 I and r 6= D
Input-output technologies (9) 8g 2 G Y g: Production level G
Constant elasticity of transformation (10) 8k 2 K Xg: Index on CET activity G
(11) 8g 2 (I [ J) (No Export Coe±cients for g 2 (I [ J))
Exports (12) 8k 2 K and r 6= D EX
g
r : Exports G £ (R ¡ 1)
(13) 8g 2 (I [ J) and r 6= D
Imports (14) 8g 2 G and r 6= D IM
g
r : Imports (net of FDI-¯rm imports) G £ (R ¡ 1)
Unit expenditure function (15) U: Household utility index 1
Unit cost of public purchase (16) PUB: Government Activity 1
Unit cost of investment (17) INV : Investment Activity 1
Market clearance conditions:
Composite goods and services (18) 8g 2 G P Ag : Composite price indexes G
D-S composites (19) 8g 2 (I [ J) and r 6= D P
g
r : Prices of D-S composites (I + J) £ R
(20) 8g 2 (I [ J) and r = D
Markets for IRTS composite input (21) 8g 2 (I + J) PMCg: Composite input prices (I + J) £ R
Markets for domestic output (22) 8k 2 K PDg: Domestic output prices G
(23) 8i 2 I
(24) 8j 2 J
Markets for export output (25) 8k 2 K and r 6= D PXk
r : Export output prices K £ (R ¡ 1)
Markets for gross output (26) 8g 2 G PY g: Output prices G
Markets for imports (27) 8i 2 I and r 6= D PM
g
r : Import prices G £ (R ¡ 1)
(28) 8j 2 J and r 6= D
(29) 8k 2 K and r 6= D
Factor markets (30) 8f 2 F PFf: Factor prices F
IRTS speci¯c factors (31) 8g 2 (I [ J) PZ
g
r : Sector-speci¯c capital price (I + J) £ R
Fixed real investment (32) PINV : Unit cost of investment 1
Fixed real public spending (33) PG: Unit cost of public good 1
Enterprise owner transfers (34) PE: Price of a claim on ¯rm income 1
Nominal utility equals Income (35) PC: Unit expenditure index 1
Balance of payments (36) PFX: Price of foreign exchange 1
Income balance:
Domestic agent income (37) 8h 2 H R Ah: Household Income H
Government budget (38) G OVT: Government spending 1
Enterprise income (39) ENT: Enterprise income 1
Foreign Entrepreneur (40) FE: External agent income 1
Auxiliary Conditions:
Fixed real public spending (41) T: Index on direct taxes 1
Foreign Savings (42) KA: Capital Account 1
Total Dimensions: 6G + 6[(I + J) £ R] + 3[G £ (R ¡ 1)] + [K £ (R ¡ 1)] + F + H + 13 = 1; 364
3Assuming a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregation of the components we
































































F8g 2 (I [ J) is the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution and ¾k
DM is the
Armington elasticity of substitution on CRTS goods. The arguments of these functions are
the component prices. The Á parameters are CES distribution parameters that indicate
scale and weighting of the arguments. These are calibrated to the Kenyan social accounts
such that the accounts are replicated in the benchmark equilibrium.
For the IRTS sectors we have the Dixit-Stiglitz price indexes. These are functions of
the number of varieties, ¯rm-level costs, and the optimal markup. Assuming each ¯rm is
small relative to the size of the market the demand elasticity for a ¯rm's variety is ¾
g
F and
the optimal markup over marginal cost is given by 1=(1 ¡ 1
¾
g
F ). Let marginal cost equal
PMCg
r 8g 2 (I [ J), which is the price of a composite input to the Dixit-Stiglitz ¯rms
associated with region-r, and let the number of varieties by region equal Ng
r 8g 2 (I [J).



























8g 2 (I [ J): (4)
In equilibrium, the number of varieties by region adjusts such that we have zero pro¯ts.
Denote the Dixit-Stiglitz composite activity level associated with equation (4) by Qg
r 8g 2







F). Assuming that ¯xed and variable costs are satis¯ed using the same
input technology, and a ¯rm-level ¯xed cost of fg















= 0 8g 2 (I [ J): (5)
The technologies for producing the composite inputs for use in the Dixit-Stiglitz sectors
depend on the type of sector. For all of the sectors there is a sector-speci¯c capital input
from the respective source region. Let PZg
r 8g 2 (I [J) be the price of this sector-speci¯c
capital input. Domestic ¯rms (producing goods or services) use domestic inputs, so the






















; for r = D; (6)
where ²g
r is the elasticity of substitution between the sector-speci¯c capital input and other
inputs, and the µ's are the CES distribution parameters. Imports of Dixit-Stiglitz goods























; for r 6= D: (7)
FDI ¯rms, on the other hand, use domestic inputs as well as a specialized imported service
from the sources region. The price of the specialized imports equals the price of foreign
exchange (denoted PFX) times one plus the tari® rate (denoted ti
r). The unit cost for























; for r 6= D:(8)
5For the CRTS sectors and upstream of the IRTS technologies, we have domestic pro-
duction in accordance with the input output data. Denote the price of this output PY s,
for s 2 G. The technology includes an upstream Cobb-Douglas value-added nest which
then combines with intermediates (trading at PAg) in ¯xed proportions. Let PFf indicate






















For the CRTS sectors a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) activity splits
domestic output (with a unit value PY k) into goods destine for domestic versus the
region-speci¯c export markets. Let the export price (for goods destine for region r 6= D)
be PXk




















where ¾¿ indicates the elasticity of transformation and the ° are the CET distribution
parameters. In the case of IRTS sectors, we assume that domestic ¯rms use domestic
output to produce Dixit-Stiglitz varieties. Thus the CET technology collapses without
export coe±cients [°g
r = 0 8g 2 (I [ J)]:
PD
g = PY
g 8g 2 (I [ J): (11)
For CRTS sectors the export commodity is traded for foreign exchange at a ¯xed rate.
Let PFX equal the price of foreign exchange, and with a choice of units such that all unit




r for r 6= D: (12)
For the IRTS sectors, domestic ¯rms export the ¯rm-level good where foreign agents are
assumed to behave according to Dixit-Stiglitz preferences that are the same as domestic
agents. Domestic IRTS ¯rms face an export demand elasticity for their variety of ¾
g
F
and thus price their exports using the optimal markup. In aggregate the IRTS export




















8g 2 (I [ J) and r 6= D: (13)
Cross-border imports are purchased at the price of foreign exchange times one plus
the tari® rate, which sets up the arbitrage condition for each import activity;
PM
g
r = (1 + t
g
r)PFX for r 6= D: (14)
Final demand includes three categories: household demand, government demand, and
investment. The representative agents for each household h are assumed to have identical
Cobb-Douglas preferences over the aggregated goods and services. The preferences are
speci¯ed via a unit expenditure function associated with an economy-wide utility index



























Equations (1) through (17) de¯ne all of the transformation technologies for the model.
Next we turn to a speci¯cation of the market clearance conditions for each price.
2 Market clearance conditions
For each good or service there is a market, and, for any non-zero equilibrium price, supply
will equal demand. We will use the convention of equating supply, on the left-hand
side, to demand, on the right-hand side. The unit-value functions presented above are
quite useful in deriving the appropriate compensated demand functions, by the envelope
theorem (Shephard's Lemma).
Supply of the composite goods and services, trading at PAg, is given by the activity
level, Ag, and demand is derived from each production or ¯nal demand activity that uses






























8g 2 (I [ J); for r 6= D; (19)


















r 8g 2 (I [ J): (20)
The IRTS composite input (trading at PMCg
r) is supplied by an activity, denoted Zg
r 8g 2














F) 8g 2 (I [ J): (21)






F) so the use of the input




F) plus the total input use on ¯xed costs, fg
rNg
r.
Market clearance for the domestic output of CRTS sectors depends on supply from



















For IRTS sectors, supply is simply given by the CET activity (as there are no export
coe±cients in the CET technology for IRTS sectors). Output is then demanded by either















































for the Dixit-Stiglitz goods sectors.
9Market clearance for exports of CRTS output is given by the CET supply function












r; for r 6= D: (25)
Reconciling gross output with the CET activities, we have market clearance for the com-




Import supply is perfectly elastic and import demand is derived from the Armington













































Factor markets clear, where factor supply is given by the exogenous endowments to


















In addition, we have the market for the speci¯c factor used in the IRTS sectors. Denoting
10the regional endowments of the speci¯c factors SF
g
















8g 2 (I [ J): (31)





savh + savent + savG + savrow: (32)






Enterprises earn net income of ENT, other agents (households, the government, and
foreign entrepreneurs) own claims to this income. We set up the transfer of income as a
market clearance condition for claims, which trade at a price PE. The claims are indicated








Thus the nominal value of enterprise income transferred to households, the government,
and foreign entrepreneurs equals ENT.
Household utility (U) equals nominal income across households scaled by the true-
cost-of-living index. That is, we represent an aggregate activity U, which supplies utils to
the households. For the representative agent of household type h denote nominal income






The ¯nal market clearance condition reconciles the balance of payments. The supply of
foreign exchange includes its generation in the export activities and net borrowing from
the rest of the world (net capital account surpluses). The real capital account surplus
includes an endogenous component, denoted KA, and an exogenous residual transfer (from
foreigners to the domestic government), denoted ftrn. Foreign exchange is demanded for







































where FE equals the nominal claims that the foreign entrepreneurs have on speci¯c factor
rents and enterprise income.
3 Income Balance Conditions
The representative agent for household h earns income from factor endowments and claims
on enterprise income, but disposable income nets out savings and direct taxes. Real sav-
ings is held ¯xed (by the coe±cient savh). We also hold ¯xed the real level of government
spending, but this requires an adjustment in direct taxes on households. Removal of tar-
i®s, for example, impact the government budget and the shortfall is made up for by an
12endogenous increase in the direct taxes on households. We use the auxiliary variable T







¡ dtaxhPG £ T (37)
The government budget is given by direct taxes, sales taxes, tari® revenues, and claims on
enterprise income. The government budget also captures the capital account balance and
its conversion to investment by foreign agents.2 In addition, the government's budget is
augmented by foreign transfers of foreign exchange and reduced by direct public savings.
The full nominal government budget is









































+ (PFX)KA ¡ savrowPINV
+ ftrnPFX
2Nominal government income is increased by (PFX)KA but this is o®set by nominal investments of
(savrow)PINV . Equation (42) is added to the equilibrium system to ensure that the nominal value of
capital in°ows equals the nominal investment by the modeled government agent acting on behalf of the
foreign investors.
13¡ savGPINV (38)
Again, the index T is adjusted endogenously to hold the real level of public spending
¯xed.
We now turn to enterprise income. Enterprises earn income on the domestic speci¯c
factors. Real spending by enterprises on direct taxes and savings are held ¯xed. The
net income is then available to be transferred to one of the agents [via equation (34)].











We also need an agent representing the foreign entrepreneur. The foreign entrepreneur's
nominal income is FE, which is spent on foreign exchange, and consists of the speci¯c










r + ³FEPE (40)
4 Auxiliary Conditions
In addition to the three sets of standard conditions presented above, we need to close the
model with a couple of auxiliary conditions. First, we need to determine the index on
direct taxes of households. Associated with the variable T is the following condition:
PUB = pub: (41)
14This holds ¯xed the real size of the government at the exogenous level pub. Lastly, we
reconcile relative price changes that a®ect capital °ows. Foreign agents interested in
investing in Kenya will consider the relative price of investment to the price of foreign
exchange. Associated with the variable KA is the following condition:
(PFX)KA = (savrow)PINV: (42)
From the perspective of the foreign agent, real indirect investment in Kenya is held ¯xed,
and the term [(PFX)KA ¡ savrowPINV ] drops out of the government budget.
Equations (1) through (42) de¯ne the general equilibrium simulation model of Kenya.
The fuctions are calibrated to the social accounts, such that the social accounts are
replicated in the benchmark solution.
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A note on the relationship between sector speci¯c capital and the elasticity
of supply in applied general equilibrium models of imperfect competition¤
Edward J. Balistreri




The models developed by Balistreri et al. (2009) and Jensen et al. (2008) to analyze ser-
vices liberalization in Kenya and Tanzania utilize a speci¯c-factor formulation. The speci¯c-
factor formulation facilitates a calibration of the FDI and domestic service responses. This
is important because the empirical evidence [Hummels and Klenow (2005)] indicates that
varieties expand less than proportionately to market size. The expansion of services bids up
the price of the speci¯c factor resulting in increasing costs (upward sloping supply). These
increasing costs ensure that the varieties expand less than proportionately to market size.
The predetermined elasticity of supply controls the magnitude of these e®ects. This note
outlines the calibration procedure.
One can calibrate a linearly-homogeneous (constant-returns) Constant Elasticity of Sub-
stitution (CES) technology to an arbitrary price elasticity of supply if some of the input
value is allocated to a speci¯c factor. In the context of the Kenyan and Tanzania models
the supply elasticity applies to the composite input that is used in both ¯xed and variable
costs associated with the services sectors.
To simplify the presentation, consider the composite input for a single type of ¯rm (say
domestic ¯rms) and for a single industry (say Communications). Let the quantity of this
¤This note is largely based on lecture notes from Thomas F. Rutherford's graduate course on Computa-
tional Economics at the University of Colorado (late 1990's)
1composite input be denoted y with a market price of p. Denote the associated nested
CES unit cost function c(~ r), where ~ r is a vector of input prices. With competition for the
composite input we have
p = c(~ r) ´ minf~ r
0~ x s.t. f(~ x) = 1g; (1)
where ~ x is the vector of inputs and the function, y = f(~ x), is the CES technology for
aggregating inputs. Denote the ¯xed quantity of the sector speci¯c input ¹ R with price r1,
and assume that all of the mobile inputs can be combined into a separable composite X
with composite price r2 (that is, ~ x = f ¹ R;Xg and ~ r = fr1;r2g).1 We thus have the explicit
expression:
p = c(r1;r2) ´ min
½









where ½ indicates the elasticity of substitution, ¾ = 1=(1 ¡ ½), and ®R and ®X are the
CES distribution parameters. Choosing units carefully (such that p = r1 = r2 = 1) at the










where µ is the benchmark value share of the sector speci¯c input. Given that the quantity
¹ R is ¯xed in supply the price r1 is a residual. The technology de facto exhibits decreasing
returns (upward sloping supply) because the only way to increase y is to increase X at
1The variable X is a nested CES subcomposite of all of the inputs excluding ¹ R. De¯ne ~ z as the vector
of all inputs other than ¹ R, and de¯ne ~ s as the vector of corresponding input prices. Let X = g(~ z), so we
have r2 = minf~ s 0~ z s.t. g(~ z) = 1g, where g(~ z) is a nested CES function and the input vector ~ z may include
intermediates. The actual speci¯cation of g(~ z) is not a concern here because the supply elasticity is inherently
dependent on the concept of partial di®erentiation (changes in the elements in ~ s are not considered). In fact,
we are only concerned with the supply elasticity local to the benchmark equilibrium, where r2 takes on a
speci¯c numeric value.
2diminishing marginal product (as the ¹ R to X ratio falls).
Using Shepard's lemma to derive demand for ¹ R we can represent the overall resource
constraint on the speci¯c factor as follows:
























+ (1 ¡ µ)r
1¡¾
2 : (6)
Solving for y as a function of the resource constraint and the price ratio (r2=p) we have
supply:































This equation gives us the fundamental relationship between the local supply elasticity and
the CES parameters.
3Notice that there are many combinations of value shares and substitution elasticities that
yield the same local supply elasticity. If the goal is to calibrate the model to a given value of
´ there are a couple of options. For example, one could simply lock down the value of ¾ (at
say ¾ = 1, which is Cobb-Douglas) and then calculate the appropriate overall value share of
the speci¯c factor (at ¾ = 1 we have µ = 1=(1+´)). In empirical applications, however, this
calibration method can be problematic, because the value of µ may be constrained by the
social accounts.
In the Kenya and Tanzania models we choose a di®erent calibration strategy. We observe
the value of capital payments in the social accounts, and it is logical that these include
payments to the speci¯c factor. Denote the observed capital payments vk and the overall
value of output vy. Now if we choose a share of the capital payments that should be allocated






where µ = µk(vk=vy).
In sensitivity analysis on the Kenya and Tanzania models we hold ¯xed the value of
µk = 0:5 and vary the value of ´. As ´ increases the calibrated elasticity of substitution
increases and we observe a more elastic supply response. In terms of varieties, we observe
that the change in the number of varieties is closer to proportional to the change in market
size as ´ increases.
One might consider sensitivity analysis on the value of µk, but this will not necessarily
generate intuitive responses. In fact, as long as the counterfactual is local to the benchmark
equilibrium there should be no e®ect of changing µk. As µk increases the value of µ=(1 ¡ µ)
falls and, according to equation (10), the calibrated value of ¾ falls to compensate. So larger
value shares will not necessarily generate larger supply responses. In fact, by design, the
4local impact of a change in µk is zero.
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